Remembering Chrystal MacMillan: Women\u27s Equality and Nationality in International Law by Knop, Karen & Chinkin, Christine
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 22 Issue 4 
2001 
Remembering Chrystal MacMillan: Women's Equality and 
Nationality in International Law 
Karen Knop 
University of Toronto 
Christine Chinkin 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Immigration Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen Knop & Christine Chinkin, Remembering Chrystal MacMillan: Women's Equality and Nationality in 
International Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 523 (2001). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol22/iss4/1 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REMEMBERING CHRYSTAL MACMILLAN:




I. CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE ....................................................... 532
II. NATIONALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW ..... 536
A. The Concept of Nationality .................................................. 536
B. Bases for Nationality ........................................................... 542
III. ANALYZING WOMEN'S EQUALITY IN NATIONALITY LAW ........... 544
A. First-Generation Issue of Equality: Nationality of
M arried W om en .................................................................... 544
B. Second-Generation Issues of Equality ................................. 546
1. Ability to Pass Nationality to Children ......................... 546
2. Naturalization Procedures ............................................. 548
C. Third-Generation Issues of Equality .................................... 550
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIMES .................................................... 556
A . Inequality ............................................................................. 557
B. Statelessness and Dual Nationality ...................................... 561
* Dr. Karen Knop, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law.
** Dr. Christine Chinkin, Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science. The
authors were respectively Rapporteur and Chair, International Law Association, Committee on
Feminism and International Law until 2000. This article is based upon the Final Report of that
Committee on Women's Equality and Nationality in International Law, which reflects contributions
by Committee members, and is in that sense a joint enterprise. Committee members were: Junko
Akiba-Torii (Japan), Andrew C. Bymes (Hong Kong), Hilary Charlesworth (Australia), Mai Chen
(New Zealand), Patricia Conlan (Ireland, alternate), Alpha Connelly (Ireland), M. Kirilova Eriksson
(Sweden), Anne Gallagher (Australia, alternate), Alda Gant (Brazil), Savitri W.E. Gooneskere (Sri
Lanka), Anja-Riitta Ketokoski (Finland), Annette Lansink Kirk-Cohen (South Africa), Ludmila V.
Korbut (Russia), Virginia Leary (United States), Maria Laeticia P Loenen (The Netherlands), Ms.
Justice Sujata V. Manohar (India), Karin Oellers-Frahm (Germany), Catherine Redgwell (United
Kingdom), Zenaida P. Reyes (Philippines), Jenny Huei-Yi Shyu (Taiwan, Republic of China), Lilly
Sucharipa (Austria), Giuseppe Vedovato (Italy), Tania Wasserstein (Brazil), and Chih-yu Wu (Tai-
wan, Republic of China, alternate). David Berry (West Indies) contributed to the Committee's work,
although he only subsequently became a member of the Committee.
The Committee would like to thank the following for their help with the Final Report: Carol
Batchelor (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Geneva), Johanna (Myyra) Blom, Re-
becca Cook, Sara Hossain (Interights, London), Urfan Khaliq, Zdenka Machnyikova, Sandra
Raponi, and Alison Symington.
The Final Report was considered by the International Law Association at its 69th conference,
held in London in July, 2000. In preparing this article, the authors have made every effort to update
the sources used in the Final Report, but in some instances were unable to obtain more recent in-
formation. The authors are grateful to Radu Popa and Marylin Raisch for their assistance with this
updating.
Michigan Journal of International Law
C . E quality ................................................................................ 570
1. Equality Rights in Nationality Law ............................... 570
2. Equality and Other Rights Related to Nationality ......... 574
D . Children's R ights ................................................................. 579
C ON CLU SION .......................................................................................... 582
In 1923, Chrystal Macmillan appeared before the International Law
Association (ILA) and urged the Association to endorse the legal principle
that women should have the same right as men to choose their nationality.'
Macmillan was perhaps the closest thing to a prominent feminist in-
ternational lawyer of the time. Although not called to the English Bar
until 1924,2 shortly after admission was granted to women, she had al-
ready used her legal knowledge for many years to argue the causes of
women's suffrage and pacifism.3 In 1908, Macmillan pleaded in person
before the House of Lords in Nairn v. University of St. Andrews.4 Women
did not then have the vote, but "persons" who were graduates of a Scot-
tish university had the right to vote for the representative of their
university in Parliament. A graduate of the University of Edinburgh
(M.A. and B.Sc. with first class honors in mathematics and natural phi-
losophy),5 Macmillan argued-unsuccessfully--in Nairn that "persons"
should be interpreted to include women.6
Along with a small number of women pacifists, including the Ameri-
can peace activists and later Nobel Peace Prize recipients Jane Addams
and Emily Balch, Macmillan was central to the International Congress
of Women held at The Hague in the midst of World War I. Not only did
the Congress formulate a series of resolutions for a just peace, but two
delegations of women appointed by the Congress, Macmillan on one,
traveled from one country to the next with the purpose of conveying its
resolutions to belligerent and neutral governments alike. In particular,
they sought to build support for the Congress's plan to end the war
through mediation by a conference of neutral states. Between them, the
delegations succeeded in visiting fourteen countries and meeting with
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 32D CONFERENCE REPORT 40-44 (1923) [hereinafter
32D CONFERENCE REPORT] (transcript of presentation by Chrystal Macmillan).
2. Obituary: Miss Chrystal Macmillan, TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 1937, at 14d.
3. Cicely Hamilton, Miss Chrystal Macmillan: Appreciations, TIMES (London), Sept. 23,
1937, at 14c.
4. Naim v. University of St. Andrews, [1909] A.C. 147 (H.L.).
5. Obituary, supra note 2.
6. On this and other "persons" cases, see ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, ch. 1, Britain:
Are Women "Persons"?, in SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1978).
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twenty-two prime ministers and foreign ministers, the presidents of two
republics, a king, and the Pope.7
Macmillan also became a leader in the campaign for the right of
married women to choose their nationality independent of their hus-
band's nationality, which became a priority for feminists after World
War .8 In addition to her involvement in efforts to reform British nation-
ality law,9 she was a spokeswoman for equality in international fora, as
her appearance before the ILA indicates. Macmillan chaired a women's
international demonstration on the subject of married women's national-
ity at The Hague and led deputations from the demonstration to the
Codification Conference held there in 1930. '0 Feminist dissatisfaction
with the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Con-
flict of Nationality Laws (Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality
Laws)," which emerged from the Codification Conference, caused the
League of Nations to create a Women's Consultative Committee on Na-
tionality.12 Macmillan convened the international action committee that
lobbied the League3 and served as a member of the resulting Committee
in the early 1930s.
4
When Chrystal Macmillan addressed the International Law
Association in 1923, the issue of women's nationality was already before
the Association. At its conference the previous year, the ILA had resolved
that "it would be desirable to fix uniformly by treaty the nationality of
married women, reserving to a married woman, as far as possible, the
right to choose her own nationality."'5 Macmillan's priority was equality
for women. But the ILA was primarily concerned with the loss of
uniformity and potential for conflicts among nationality laws that arose
as some states moved away from the principle of dependent nationality,
whereby a woman's marriage to a man of another nationality
automatically caused her to lose her own nationality and acquire his.
7. JANE ADDAMS ET AL., WOMEN AT THE HAGUE: THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
WOMEN AND ITS RESULTS (Garland Publ'g 1972) (1915).
8. 32D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41. In the U.S. context, see CANDICE
LEwis BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITI-
ZENSHIP (1998).
9. Obituary, supra note 2.
10. ld.
11. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr.
12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws].
12. See Carol Ann Miller, Lobbying the League: Women's International Organizations and the
League of Nations 193-209 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with
authors).
13. LEILA J. Rupp, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT 147 (1997).
14. Obituary, supra note 2.
15. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAwAssOCIATION, 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT 257 (1922).
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Founded in Brussels in 1873 as the Association for the Reform and
Codification of the Law of Nations, the ILA had emerged from the
American pacifist movement that saw the task of reform and codification
as the prelude to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Even at its
founding, however, the idea of an association committed to the general
codification of international law and compulsory arbitration of disputes
was contested as over-ambitious and impractical.'7 And the ILA's
increasingly practice-minded membership led it to concentrate instead
on the unification of civil and commercial law.'8 Indeed, maritime law is
the area where the Association's contribution is most widely
recognized.9 Over time, the ILA nevertheless returned to public
international law, in part through its treatment of various subjects
relating to the individual, such as nationality and naturalization.'°
At the 1923 International Law Association conference, Ernest Schus-
ter, who delivered the paper on married women's nationality,2' limited
the ILA 's interest in the question to its objectives of promoting "uniform-
ity of legislation in matters affecting international intercourse" and
determining "means for the avoidance of conflicts between the laws of
different countries.,22 Schuster argued, however, that these objectives
supported a married woman's right to choose her nationality because
this was the trend rapidly emerging in domestic legislation, and encour-
agement of the trend would serve to promote uniformity and minimize
23conflicts between the nationality laws of different states. Moreover, he
personally endorsed this view on the grounds that no individual should
be required to change her nationality without her consent and that an
individual should truly bear allegiance to the state of which she is a na-
tional.24 Following the discussion of Schuster's paper, Chrystal
Macmillan presented the convention on the nationality of women pro-
posed by the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA):25 a
16. Irwin Abrams, The Emergence of the International Law Societies, 19 REv. OF POL. 361
(1957); E Munch, L'influence de l'International Law Association sur la doctrine et la pratique du
droit international, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS WRITTEN
IN HONOUR OF THE CENTENARY CELEBRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 1873-
1973 23, 23-25 (Maarten Bos ed., 1973).
17. Abrams, supra note 16, at 376-78.
18. Munch, supra note 16, at 25. See also Abrams, supra note 16, at 378-79.
19. Munch, supra note 16, at 26.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Ernest J. Schuster, The Effect of Marriage on Nationality in 32D CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 9.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. The IWSA proposal is reprinted in 32D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 1, app. at 45-
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convention based squarely on the principle that women should have the
same right as men to keep or change their nationality.
Macmillan did not carry the day. The ILA adopted a model domestic
statute and set of international treaty provisions that furthered women's
interests insofar as they addressed the problem of women's statelessness
resulting from conflicts among the nationality laws of different states.1
6
But the ILA accepted the position that "the old rule, which has come
down from early Christian times,27 should be the dominant rule still; that
is to say, that the wife should, as a rule, follow the nationality of her
husband. 28 In the view of its drafters, this solution was most likely to be
consistent with "the happiness of family life, remembering that a wife
joins a new family with her eyes open.
2
1
This article both continues and returns to the story of Chrystal Mac-
millan and the International Law Association. Some seventy-five years
later, gender discrimination still exists in nationality law. For an Ameri-
can audience, Thailand's offer of nationality to U.S. golfer Tiger Woods,
whose mother is Thai, highlighted the inequality of Thailand's laws on
nationality.3° Although Thai women, as well as Thai men, can now pass
their nationality to their children, the law continues to discriminate
against women in other matters of nationality. Whereas the foreign wives
of Thai men are specially entitled to apply for Thai nationality, the for-
eign husbands of Thai women are not. In practice, Thai women married
to foreigners are also subject to discrimination in the ownership of land.
All Thais married to foreigners are prohibited from owning property in
Thailand, but this prohibition is more easily enforced against Thai
women because their identity card reveals their marital status and their
husband's non-Thai surname. Thai men, whose marital status is not re-
corded on their identity card, can readily evade enforcement.3
26. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AssociATION, 33D CONFERENCE REPORT 25-32 (1924) [herein-
after 33D CONFERENCE REPORT].
27. There was some debate as to whether this nationality rule was long implicit in the patriar-
chal ethos of the common and civil law or a more recent addition. Compare Schuster, supra note 21,
at 10-15, with 32D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-38 (discussion of Schuster's paper at
the conference).
28. 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 24. For Macmillan's response, see id. at 40.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Woods' Vfctory, Overall Performance a Hit in Thailand, U.S.A TODAY, Feb. 10, 1997, at 7c
(final ed.); Stephen Vines, The Man People Say Will be the Black Jack Nicklaus, INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 4, 1997, at 2. We are grateful to Antony Anghie for this example.
31. Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Thailand, U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at 38-39, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/THAI2-3 (1997).
See also Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Thailand, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U9[ 226,
247-48, U.N. Doc. A/54/38, V 213-50 (1999). According to the Consular Section of the Thai
Summer 20011
Michigan Journal of International Law
Recent U.S. cases such as Miller v. Albright32 and Nguyen v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service3  demonstrate that gender discrimination
persists not only "elsewhere" but in U.S. nationality law as well. The
United States Supreme Court in Nguyen upheld a provision of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act that makes it harder for American fathers
than American mothers to pass citizenship to their children born abroad
where the other parent is not a citizen and the parents are not married to
one another. In the Court's view, the requirement that the U.S. father's
paternity be established by legitimation, acknowledgment under oath, or
adjudication before the child reaches 18 (on top of the requirement of
"clear and convincing evidence" of paternity) furthers the government's
interest in ensuring a demonstrated opportunity for the U.S. parent and
the child to develop a meaningful relationship with one another.34 Even if
the government's interest is defined more strongly as ensuring the actual
existence of such a parent-child relationship, the Court was still satisfied
that the requirement sufficiently furthers the interest.3" When the U.S.
parent is the mother, the fact of giving birth is assumed to foster real,
everyday ties between the child and the parent, and thus between the
child and the United States.36 In finding the different treatment of moth-
ers and fathers to be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection, the four dissenting Justices concluded that the differen-
tiation relies impermissibly on sexual stereotypes.37 The mother's
presence at birth does not guarantee the opportunity for a real, practical
relationship with the child. The child may be removed from the mother
on account of alleged abuse or neglect, or may be separated from the
mother by tragedy such as disaster or war. Nor, apart from stereotype, is
Embassy in Washington, D.C., the law has not changed since Thailand reported to the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. E-mail from Consular Section, Thai Em-
bassy, Washington, D.C., to Karen Knop (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with authors).
32. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). For commentary, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. ]; Debra L. Satinoff, Sex-Based Discrimination in
U.S. Immigration Law: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between What We Say
and What We Do, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353 (1998); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights are
Mothers'Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000);
Ranjana Natarajan, Note, Amerasians and Gender-Based Equal Protection Under U.S. Citizenship
Law, 30 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 123 (1998).
33. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001). See also Ashcroft v. Lake, 121 S. Ct.
2518 (2001) (vacating a Second Circuit finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) denied a U.S. citizen father
equal protection and remanding for reconsideration in light of Nguyen); United States v. Ahumada-
Aguilar, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001) (vacating a similar Ninth Circuit finding and remanding for recon-
sideration in light of Nguyen).
34. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061-64.
35. Id. at 2064.
36. Id. at2061.
37. Id. at 2071-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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there reason to say that fathers who are present at the birth lack the op-
portunity for a relationship with the child." Less permissible still is to
assume that mothers actually will develop a close relationship with their
children, but insist that fathers be shown to do so. The stereotype at work
here is that women are much more likely than men to develop caring
relationships with their children." Moreover, the dissent in Nguyen
traced the different treatment of unmarried mothers and fathers in the
Immigration and Nationality Act to the old legal regime that made
women responsible for nonmarital children and allowed men to choose
whether to assume any of the responsibility.
40
38. Id. at 2073.
39. Id. at 2074. In fact, Nguyen's unmarried Vietnamese mother abandoned him at birth, and
his U.S. father raised him from the age of five in Texas. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 208 F3d 528, 530
(5th Cir. 2000).
40. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2075-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
While this article situates the issues of gender equality in nationality law in a variety of con-
texts, it does not attempt a general analysis of how discrimination based on gender interacts with
discrimination on other bases such as race, ethnicity, and religion. In this connection, Tiger Woods's
portrayal by the media as the "black Jack Nicklaus"--a Cablinasian prodigy in the white, country-
club sport of golf-points to the relevance of race to the law and practice of citizenship. NICHOLAS
EDwARDS, TIGER WOODS: AN AMERICAN MASTER 4 (2d ed. 2001) ("Cablinasian" is Woods's term
for himself as a Caucasian-black-Native American-Asian.). For example, Hope Lewis describes the
prejudices that black women entering the United States may experience, arguing that U.S. national-
ity may make little or no difference. Hope Lewis, Reflections on "BlackCrit Theory": Human
Rights, 45 VILL. L. REv. 1075, 1085-87 (2000). Indeed, historically, the American women's cam-
paign for the independent nationality of married women was not free of anti-immigrant sentiment.
BREDBENNER, supra note 8, at 46-57. Regarding the impact of class, religion, age, and ethnicity on
the composition of the early international women's movement, including the IWSA, see Rupp, ch.
3, "Who's In, Who's Out," in supra note 13, at 51.
Also beyond the scope of this article is an analysis of how gender and nationality play into ine-
qualities of power, symbolism, and resources across countries. Here again, the story of Tiger Woods
is thought-provoking. Woods's father and mother met when Woods's father was stationed in Thai-
land with the U.S. Army. EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 6. On the one hand, African-American men
have historically been victims of race and gender stereotypes when serving with the U.S. Armed
Forces abroad. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST
SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 67-71 (updated ed. 2000) (controversy over relations between
black American male soldiers and white British women in Britain during World War 11). On the
other, the number of U.S. military posted abroad reflects the global status of the United States. In
1999, the United States had 252,763 military personnel stationed in foreign countries. Nguyen, 121
S. Ct. at 2062. As citizens of a superpower, these personnel all enjoy some degree of privilege rela-
tive to the local population, especially in the Third World. Moreover, in terms of equality between
nation-states, the U.S. citizenship rules that make citizenship harder to come by for the children born
to a U.S. father and a local mother result in allocating responsibility for the nonmarital children of
U.S. military personnel largely to the country where they are stationed. Because the U.S. military is
overwhelmingly male, id., the U.S. parent is most often the father, and U.S. citizenship is therefore
more difficult for the child to acquire. Cf id. at 2077 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (As per the dissent in
Nguyen, the Court's discussion of numbers of U.S. military personnel overseas and the proportion of
women and men serving in the military may "simply reflect the stereotype of male irresponsibil-
ity"--which equates to U.S. irresponsibility.). See also Collins, supra note 32, at 1706; Clay M.
West, Case Note, Nguyen v. INS: Is Sex Really More Important Now?, 19 YALE L. & Pot!Y REv.
525, 525 (2001).
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In light of such discrimination, the International Law Association
took up the study of women's nationality again. When the ILA chose the
topic of women's nationality this time, however, the choice was made by
the Association's Committee on Feminism and International Law. Estab-
lished in 1992, with Savitri Goonesekere of Sri Lanka as its first Chair,
the Committee comprises international lawyers from around the world,
most of whom are women. Whereas Macmillan's were outsider propos-
als, prepared by the International Woman Suffrage Alliance and
presented by her to the ILA, the ILA's new recommendations on
women's equality and nationality in international law were developed
inside the Association by this Committee. And unlike the ILA's earlier
preoccupation with the needs of the public and private international law
order, to say nothing of patriarchy, the Committee's aim was gender
equality. In particular, the Committee sought to enhance the understand-
ing of how international law and international human rights law might
further equality in domestic nationality law. In another contrast to Mac-
millan's experience, the Committee's recommendations, including non-
discrimination on the grounds of sex, sexual orientation, culture, marital
status, or any combination thereof, were adopted by the ILA at its mil-
lennium conference held in 2000.
The ongoing need to examine and promote equality in matters of na-
tionality is apparent from the examples of Tiger Woods and the U.S.
Supreme Court judgments in Miller and Nguyen. Parts I and II of the
article expand on this contemporary relevance. Part I gives a sample of
gender-related developments in nationality laws worldwide since 1990,
and Part II surveys the current thinking on the nature and value of na-
tionality.
The ILA's discussion of women's nationality in the 1920s, however,
is not simply a point of departure. It also serves as a reminder that the
idea of equality must contend with ideas of nationality in international
law. This has been all but forgotten, perhaps because equality-based ar-
guments are now most often situated in international human rights law
where they compete mainly with ideas of community and culture. While
nationality is linked to community and culture, and much else, in impor-
tant and complicated ways, it is not synonymous with them.4
Accordingly, gender equality must also be analyzed in the historical,
strategic, and conceptual contexts of nationality. Historically, equality
has made demands on nationality, and nationality has resisted and con-
41. While there are similarities between a woman's equal right to the membership in the state
that nationality in the traditional international law sense represents and a woman's equal right to
membership in a community within the state, such as an indigenous people or ethnic minority, there
are also important differences. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (forthcoming Mar. 2002). Accordingly, the latter is not discussed in this article.
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tinues to resist in its own (gendered) terms. Strategically, nevertheless,
the international rules on nationality offer certain practical protections to
women-again, according to the prevailing logic of nationality in inter-
national law. Lastly, a conceptual understanding of the value of
nationality aids in identifying what equality requires be preserved
equally, whether via nationality or otherwise.
Parts III and IV of the article bring the historical, strategic, and con-
ceptual contexts of nationality to the analysis of women's claims to
equality and the various international legal regimes available to address
these multi-layered claims. Part III thereby shows that gender discrimi-
nation in nationality law is not a single, uniform issue that continues
unbroken from the 1920s, but rather three generations of issues, each
generation created by the previous one. Besides providing a more precise
measure of progress toward equality, the idea of generations demon-
strates that many of the current law reform efforts may not actually
achieve equality. Whereas the second generation of issues predominates
in the caselaw, Part III points to an emerging third generation of equality
issues related to nationality and identifies the alternative approaches and
arguments needed to address this latest generation.
Part III thus furnishes a new conceptual understanding of what
equality requires. With this in mind, Part IV examines and evaluates the
historical development of international law as it concerns women's na-
tionality. Whereas the usual tendency is to concentrate on the
international human rights guarantees of nondiscrimination on the
ground of sex, whether general or specific to nationality, Part IV also
canvases the relevant developments in other international legal regimes
with other bases. As well as the international human rights law regime
derived from equality, Part IV discusses the public international law re-
gime historically configured on one family-one nationality (the husband
and father's) and subsequently reconfigured on one person-one national-
ity, and the child-centered regime of international children's rights. In
attending to the different logic of the different regimes, the discussion
takes seriously both the nature of the resistance to equality that they may
continue to generate and their strategic usefulness. The conclusion pre-
sents and discusses the ILA's resulting recommendations.
A final word should perhaps be said about the International Law
Association as the tradition within which this article works. Integral to
the creation of the ILA was the belief that the Association should be
open, alive to the international civil society of the time, and active in
political and legal discussions about reform.42 It is in this early spirit of
42. MUnch, supra note 16, at 23-24. This approach contrasted with that of the Institut de droit
international, founded the same year as the ILA. See id.; Abrams, supra note 16. On the "men of
Summer 2001]
Michigan Journal of International Law
engagement that we contribute the article to what needs to be a broader
dialogue about equality and nationality.43
I. CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
With the 1991 judgment of the Botswana High Court" and 1992
judgment of the Court of Appeal4 5 in Unity Dow v. Attorney General of
Botswana, issues of nationality regained their historical prominence in
the struggle for women's equality in international and domestic law. In
Unity Dow, both the lower court and the appeal court used international
standards and obligations to find that a law allowing only a father or an
unmarried mother to pass Botswana citizenship to his or her children
born in Botswana was unconstitutional on grounds of sex discrimination.
The applicant, Unity Dow, was a citizen of Botswana married to a U.S.
citizen. Although she was born in Botswana, the couple lived in Bot-
swana, and their children were born and were growing up in Botswana,
Unity Dow, as a married woman, was unable to pass Botswana citizen-
ship to her children. Had the children instead been born in Botswana to a
Botswana man married to a non-Botswana woman, they would have
been Botswana citizens. Without citizenship, Unity Dow's children could
remain in Botswana as legal aliens only if they formed part of their fa-
ther's residency permit, which Botswana granted for no more than two
years at a time. Since the children would have to travel on their father's
passport, Unity Dow would not be entitled to return to Botswana with her
children in the absence of their father. While she was jointly responsible
with her husband for the education of their children, her children, as non-
citizens, did not qualify for financial assistance for university education. In
arguing that the citizenship law was unconstitutional, Unity Dow success-
1873"' see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, ch. 1, "The Legal Conscience of the Civilized World", in THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 11
(2001). The Institut de droit international also tackled the issue of married women's nationality.
Pressed by James Brown Scott to adopt the equality of women and men as the guiding principle, the
Institut recommended that while a spouse's nationality should not be changed without his or her
consent, either spouse should be able to acquire the other's nationality as quickly as possible. A.N.
Makarov, La Nationalitide lafemme marige, 60 RECUEIL DES COURS [REC. DES COURs] 115, 141-
45(1937).
43. For further contributions by the present authors, see CHRISTINE CHINKIN, NATIONALITY,
CITIZENSHIP AND WOMEN (United Nations Division for the Advancement of'Women, forthcoming);
Karen Knop, Relational Nationality: On Gender and Nationality in International Law, in CITIZEN-
SHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 89 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
44. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1991] Law Rep. Commonwealth (Const.)
574 (Bots. H. Ct.).




fully invoked the right of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex contained
in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (the Women's Convention), 6 the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples' Rights,47 and other international instruments.
In the courts of other states, the outcome of cases challenging
nationality laws on grounds of discrimination against women has varied
over the past decade.8 In 1994, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court used the
Unity Dow case, along with the jurisprudence of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights49 and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights), ° to hold that the freedom of movement
guaranteed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe entitles a female citizen of
Zimbabwe married to a foreign citizen to reside permanently with her
husband in Zimbabwe.' In a later case, the Court expanded this ruling to
the foreign husband's right to work in Zimbabwe. 2 Although the
Constitution of Zimbabwe was subsequently amended to provide that
freedom of movement does not prevent the imposition of restrictions on
the movement or residence in Zimbabwe of any person who is neither a
citizen nor a permanent resident or the expulsion of any person who is not
a citizen "whether or not he is married or related to another person who is
a citizen of or permanently resident in Zimbabwe,"53 the Court interpreted
this amendment as leaving untouched the two earlier decisions.54 In
contrast, Unity Dow and the Women's Convention and European Court of
Human Rights caselaw failed to persuade the High Court Division of the
Bangladesh Supreme Court that tracing Bangladesh citizenship through
46. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Women's Convention].
47. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58.
48. See e.g. Savitri W.E. Goonesekere, Nationality and Women's Human Rights: The
Asia/Pacific Experience, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN DOMESTIC LITIGATION (PAPERS AND STATEMENTS FROM THE
ASIA/SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONAL JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM, HONG KONG, MAY 20-22, 1996) 86, 94-
96 (Andrew Byrnes et al. eds., 1997); ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION, 31-
32 (1997).
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.TS. 171.
50. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
51. Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (2) SA 182 (Zimb.).
52. Salem v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (4) SA 280 (Zimb.).
53. ZIMB. CONST. § 22(3)(d).
54. Kohlhaas v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1998 (6) BCLR 757 (Zimb.). See also
Hambly v. Chief Immigration Officer 1999 (9) BCLR 966 (Zimb.).
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the male line violated fundamental human rights.55 Whereas the Supreme
Court of Sri Lanka in 1999 found that the Sri Lankan government policy
that routinely granted residence visas to foreign wives of Sri Lankan
citizens, but only exceptionally to foreign husbands, was
unconstitutional,56 a Pakistani court in 1997 upheld the provisions of the
Pakistan Citizenship Act57 that entitled a foreign woman married to a
Pakistani man to the citizenship of Pakistan, but not a foreign man married
to a Pakistani woman. The Pakistan Citizenship Act was subsequently
amended." The Supreme Court of Canada in 1997 rejected the stricter
treatment under the Canadian Citizenship Act of persons seeking
Canadian citizenship who had Canadian mothers, as compared to those
who had Canadian fathers,6' yet the United States Supreme Court in
Miller62 and Nguyen accepted the additional requirements imposed by the
U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act6" on persons seeking U.S.
citizenship where their U.S. parent was the father.
The uncertain progress toward equal rights for women with respect
to nationality is confirmed by states' positions on article 9 of the
Women's Convention. A significant number of states have made reserva-
tions to article 9, which gives women equal rights with men to acquire,
change, or retain their nationality, and equal rights with respect to the
nationality of their children. Although Cyprus, Fiji, Jamaica, Liechten-
stein, Republic of Korea, and Thailand have withdrawn their reservations
55. Malkani v. Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs of Bangladesh (Bangl. Sup. Ct.,
High Ct. Div., Dhaka 1997) (Writ Petition No. 3192 of 1992) (uncertified copy on file with authors).
See also Lubna Mariam, Whither Equal Rights?, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangladesh), Jan. 26, 1998,
available at http://www.dailystamews.com/199801/26/n8012609.htm; Fostina Paraira, Woman's
Right to Transmit Citizenship to Her Children is Denied, DAILY STAR (Dhaka, Bangladesh), Jan. 18,
1998, available at http://www.dailystamews.com/199801/18/n801I809.htm.
56. Fischer v. Controller of Inmigration and Emigration (Sri Lanka Sup. Ct. 1999), as summa-
rized in 2 COMMONWEALTH HUM. RTS. L. DIG. 346 (2000), available at http://
www.interights.org/ccl. See also Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in
the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 233, 256-57 (1999) (pointing to the serious bureaucratic
obstacles before alien men who wish to establish permanent residency in Israel based on their mar-
riage to Israeli women, especially Palestinian men from the West Bank or Gaza who are married to
Arab Israeli women).
57. Citizenship Act, No. 2 of 1951 (Pak.).
58. Sharifan v. Federation of Pakistan, 50 All Pak. Legal Decisions (Lahore) 59 (High Ct.
1997).
59. Press Release, Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.forisb.org/PRO I-49.htm.
60. Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-29 (1985) (Can.); Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-19 (1970)
(Can.).
61. Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358.
62. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
63. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1999).
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since 1990," nine states that ratified or acceded to the Women's Conven-
tion during the same period entered reservations to article 9.66 Algeria,
Bahamas,61 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, France,68
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia,69 Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore (without explicit reference to article 9), Tunisia, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom, also on behalf of its dependent territories, currently
maintain reservations or interpretive declarations with respect to all or
part of article 9. Moreover, this list includes neither those states party to
the Women's Convention that have made other reservations which poten-
tially affect the nationality rights of women, nor those with
discriminatory nationality laws that have not reserved. 0 Nor, of course,
does it include states that are not party to the Women's Convention'
65. United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/engfishintemetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treaty9.asp. In 1996, the United Kingdom withdrew part of its reservation to article
9.Id.
66. Id. Algeria, Bahamas, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia.
67. See David S. Berry, International Law and the Violation of Women's Rights to Nationality:
A Caribbean Perspective (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
68. Declaration not confirmed in substance upon ratification. United Nations Treaty Collec-
tion, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/part/chapterV/treaty9.asp.
69. In 1998, Malaysia withdrew its reservation to article 9(1) and indicated that it would re-
view its remaining reservation to article 9(2) if the relevant law was amended. Id.
70. Venezuela is a clear example of the latter. Although its new constitution provides for the
foreign spouse of a Venezuelan national to acquire Venezuelan nationality by naturalization, Nation-
ality, THE WOMEN'S WATCH (Int'l Women's Rts. Action Watch Project, Humphrey Inst. Pub. Aff.,
Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 2000, at 4, the previous constitution limited this option to foreign wives.
Words and Deeds: Holding Governments Accountable in the Beijing + 5 Review Process, WOMEN'S
ACrION (Equality Now, New York, NY), July 1999, at 13. Since Venezuela had never reserved, this
earlier discrimination would not have been identifiable through reservations to the Women's Con-
vention.
Nepal is another such example. The Nepal Supreme Court found that a regulation discriminat-
ing against foreign spouses of Nepalese women in the issue of visas was inconsistent with the
constitutional guarantee of gender equality. Goonesekere, supra note 48, at 95. However, the Consti-
tution of Nepal itself discriminates against women in its article on the acquisition of citizenship
(§ 9), which is contained in a different part of the Constitution from the right to equality (§ 11) and
has therefore been argued to be beyond a constitutional equality challenge. NEPAL CONST., avail-
able at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.delaw/npOOOO0.html. The Forum for Women, Law and
Development (Nepal) is working to change the discriminatory aspects of Nepalese nationality law.
E-mails from the Forum for Women, Law and Development (Nepal) to Karen Knop (Apr. 20 and
23, 2000) (on file with authors).
71. Monaco has been identified as an example of a state with discriminatory nationality laws
and is not a party to the Women's Convention. Words and Deeds, supra note 70, at 11-12.
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II. NATIONALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
If issues of nationality have become a priority again in international
and domestic campaigns for gender equality, this reflects the perception
that nationality continues to be important. The article looks next at the
nature and value of nationality in general. Part II.A defines the concept
of nationality used in the article and describes its inter- and intra-state
functions. This Part also discusses the limitations of the functions per-
formed by nationality and the forecasts for these functions or for
nationality as their principal basis. Part II.B outlines the ways that na-
tionality may be obtained. The examples throughout focus on women,
thereby highlighting the potential for even seemingly neutral laws on
nationality to serve men better than women. The main work of Part II,
though, is to set the stage for the next Part of the article, which analyzes
overt gender discrimination and its legacy in nationality law.
A. The Concept of Nationality
The concept of nationality may be understood in a number of ways.7"
Legally, it designates the formal status of membership in a state. This
legal status is usually intended to correspond to a psychological or cul-
tural experience of identity and solidarity. Nationality is also, as Hersch
Lauterpacht wrote, "an instrument for securing the rights of the individ-
ual in the national and international spheres."73 In the republican as
opposed to the liberal tradition, nationality--or, more properly, citizen-
ship 74-refers to active engagement in the political life of the state. The
analysis of gender equality in this article concentrates on the understand-
ings of nationality as a formal legal status and as "the right to have
72. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
453-89 (2000).
73. Hersch Lauterpacht, Foreword to the First Edition, in PAUL WEIs, NATIONALITY AND
STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, at xi (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1979) (1956).
74. The term "nationality" is often used interchangeably with the term "citizenship." In
international law, as well as in many domestic jurisdictions, however, nationality and citizen-
ship technically relate to different aspects of membership in a state. Nationality corresponds to
membership in a state vis-A-vis other states; that is, it stresses the international protections
afforded by membership. Citizenship is associated with full membership within the state. It
follows from the distinction between nationality and citizenship that, as Paul Weis puts it,
"[e]very citizen is a national, but not every national is necessarily a citizen...... WEis, supra
note 73, at 5-6. While the laws of a state may distinguish between different classes of nation-
als, these distinctions are not relevant in international law. Id. at 3-7.
It should be stressed that this usage of "nationality" and "citizenship" is not universal.
Where international law and most Western European states use the term "nationality," most
Eastern European states use the term "citizenship." COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON NATIONALITY AND EXPLANATORY REPORT 3 (1997).
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rights."75 In the other modes of identity and political activity, important
gender-related work on nationality has been done by postcolonial and
feminist authors in particular.76
Each state determines under its own law who are its nationals. In the
Nottebohm case, the International Court of Justice stated that "interna-
tional law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules governing the
grant of its own nationality ' 7' A state's discretion is limited by custom-
ary international law and jus cogens, and is also limited where the state
has entered into human rights treaties, whereby it binds itself under in-
ternational law to provide particular safeguards under its domestic law.78
In international law, nationality secures rights for the individual by
associating her with a state. Traditionally the subjects of international
law are states; individuals are not subjects of international law. By asso-
ciating individual with state, nationality makes one state's interference
with the national of another a violation of the other state's sovereignty.
Nationality thereby provides the state of nationality with the standing to
make a diplomatic claim with respect to the harms constituting viola-
tions of international law caused to that individual. When a state
attempts to raise such a claim, however, its grant of nationality and hence
its standing may be challenged on the ground that the individual has no
genuine link to the state.79
It is important not to overestimate the effectiveness of the diplomatic
protection function of nationality. As with any discussion of nationality,
there is the risk of implying that every individual is either the national of
75. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("Citizenship is
man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.").
76. See, e.g., BETWEEN WOMAN AND NATION. NATIONALISMS, TRANSNATIONAL FEMI-
NISMS AND THE STATE (Caren Kaplan et al. eds., 1999); FEMINIST NATIONALISM (Lois A. West
ed., 1997); KUMARI JAYAWARDENA, FEMINISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1986); NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES (Andrew Parker et al. eds., 1992); ANNE PHILLIPS,
ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY (1991); REMAKING WOMEN. FEMINISM AND MODERNITY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST (Lila Abu-Lughod ed., 1998); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEM-
ORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998);
WOMAN-NATION-STATE (NiraYuval-Davis & Floya Anthias eds., 1989).
77. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). See also European Conven-
tion on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, art. 3(1), Europ. T.S. No.166; Hague Convention on Conflict
of Nationality Laws, supra note 11, art. 1.
78. It has been argued, for example, that the deprivation by the South African government
of the nationality of Africans in the so-called independent Bantustans (Transkei, Bophuthat-
swana, Venda and Ciskei) during the apartheid era violated the prohibition on
denationalization on the grounds of race. See JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 451 (2d ed. 2000).
79. The concept of "effective nationality" has been stated in a number of decisions and
can be seen to be accepted as international law. Some of the most important decisions where
the concept has been discussed include: Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 4; Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984); Canevaro Case (Italy v. Peru), 11 R.I.A.A. 397 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1912); Salem Case (Egypt v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1161 (1932).
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some state (and therefore enjoys the rights and benefits of nationality) or
stateless (and therefore does not). But there are individuals who are sim-
ply without status altogether. An example is the hill-tribe women who
belong to one of the cultural groups that live in northern Thailand or
along western border uplands and that have distinct cultural identities
and languages. Many of these groups have moved into Thailand at dif-
ferent times over the twentieth century, and the nationality of some
continues to be unclear.0
Even if an individual has a nationality, she is not always able to
document it. This has been a problem for, among others, Polish women
who are part of the recent wave of women trafficked from Central and
Eastern Europe into Western Europe to work in the sex trade.." For these
women, nationality is not a means to diplomatic protection because often
their passports have been taken away by a pimp or brothel owner, and
they cannot prove their nationality.82 Similar problems are encountered
by women in the "maid trade": the temporary legal migration of unac-
companied women from less developed Asian states to Western Asia (the
Middle East) or to prosperous East Asian states (for example, Singapore)
to take positions as live-in domestic servants. Where their passports are
seized by their employers, they may have difficulty getting help should
they be exploited or abused, or returning home should they decide to do
SO. 83 With respect to trafficking, article 8 of the Protocol to Prevent, Sup-
press and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, which supplements the new United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, anticipates that victims may
not have proper documentation and provides for the issuing of travel
documents or whatever other authorization may be necessary to enable
the person to return to her state of nationality or permanent residence.
80. Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Thailand, supra note 31, at 21-
22. On defacto statelessness, see generally Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem
of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 156 (1998).
81. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Addendum: Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to
Poland on the Issue of Trafficking and Forced Prostitution of Women (May 24-June 1, 1996),
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.I, In 6, 44-45 (1996).
82. Id. 23, 66, 105. See also Gillian Caldwell et al., Crime & Servitude: An Expos6 of
the Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States, Address Before the
International Conference on the Trafficking of NIS Women Abroad, (Moscow, Russia, Nov. 3-
5, 1997), available at http://www.globalsurvival.net/femaletrade/971 lrussia.html.
83. Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and the
Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 79-80 (1998).
84. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000,40 I.L.M. 335 (2001).
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In any event, a state is not obliged to provide diplomatic protection
to its nationals.85 Saskia Sassen's analysis of the feminization of survival
in the global economy indicates why a state is not necessarily disposed
to help its female nationals abroad:
The last decade has seen a growing presence of women in a vari-
ety of cross-border circuits that have become a source for
livelihood, profit-making, and the accrual of foreign currency....
They include the illegal trafficking in people for the sex industry
and for various types of formal and informal labor markets. They
also include cross-border migrations, both documented and not,
which have provided an important source of convertible cur-
rency for governments in home countries. The formation and
strengthening of these circuits is largely a consequence of
broader structural conditions. Among the key actors emerging in
these particular circuits are the women themselves in search of
work, but also, and increasingly so, illegal traffickers and con-
tractors as well as the governments of home countries.86
In a Bangladesh case, however, the father of a girl abducted by child
traffickers argued successfully that the government's failure to assist in
repatriating her violated the constitutional provisions on equal protection
and protection of law generally.
87
Finally, a state traditionally could not make a diplomatic claim on
behalf of its national against another state if its national was also a na-
tional of that other state, 8 although there have been cases more recently
where the state of effective nationality was allowed to bring a claim.89
Until recently, the United Kingdom took the traditional position in the
case of British-Asian women who alleged that they were forced into
marriage' while visiting the Asian country of their ancestry. The United
Kingdom assisted these women in various ways, but refused to intervene
officially in any dispute because the women were dual nationals who
85. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb.
5).
86. Saskia Sassen, Women's Burden: Counter-geographies of Globalization and the Fem-
inization of Survival 53 J. INT'L AFF. 503, 503 (2000).
87. Abdul Gafur v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 COMMONWEALTH HUM. RTS. L. DIG.
168 (Bangl. Sup. Ct., High Ct. Div. 1997), available at http://www.interights.org/ccl.
88. See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 186 (Apr. 11).
89. E.g. Case No. A/I8, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984).
90. Forced marriages should be distinguished from arranged marriages. Forced marriages
involve coercion, whereas arranged marriages may be consented to by both parties. See infra
text accompanying note 160.
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were in the state of their second nationality.9' In response to a report on
forced marriage by a government working group, however, the British
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office have outlined a
new position on diplomatic assistance in such cases. Their joint Action
Plan, produced in 2000, states that the United Kingdom will assume a
right of consular protection for its dual nationals until proven otherwise,
will explore and test the right of consular protection for dual nationals
not habitually resident in-country, and, where dual nationality is an im-
92pediment, will treat the problem as a human rights issue.
Besides the diplomatic protection function, the other key function of
nationality in international law is the duty of the state to admit its na-
tionals and allow them to reside within its territory.93 While this is
primarily a question for domestic law, it becomes an international legal
obligation insofar as relations between states are affected. Under interna-
tional law, states have the sovereign discretion to admit aliens and,
subject to certain safeguards, to expel them. But, by not admitting its
national expelled from another state, the state of nationality infringes the
expelling state's sovereign right to choose which aliens reside in its terri-
tory. A state therefore has the duty, as between states, to admit its
nationals into its territory. This duty of admission and non-expulsion of
nationals is recognized in a number of international human rights in-
struments .94
In the long term, however, both of the functions of nationality in in-
ter-state relations may decrease in importance. The standing of a
sovereign may become less needed as the individual herself is increas-
ingly recognized as a subject of international law.95 Alternatively, such
standing may gradually cease to be based, or based exclusively, on na-
tionality. With regard to the obligation to admit, as well as with regard to
this diplomatic nexus, it is noteworthy that the repatriation article of the
new Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
91. Alison Symington, Dual Citizenship and Forced Marriages, 10 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming, 2001) (manuscript on file with authors).
92. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Joint FCO/Home Office Action Plan (2000),
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?4048.
93. See generally WEIS, supra note 73, at 45-61.
94. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, art. 12(2); American
Convention On Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 49, art. 12(4); International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 5(d)(ii), 660
U.N.TS. 195; Protocol No.4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No.46; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, art. 13(2), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
95. See RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
13-15 (2d ed. 1994).
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Especially Women and Children96 refers to the state of nationality or
permanent residence. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights97 and the European Convention on Human Rights,98 for
example, non-nationals may have certain rights to enter and to remain in
the territory of a state party. The international human rights jurispru-
dence thus supplements nationality as the ground for admission and non-
expulsion."
Within the state, the citizenship rights that flow from nationality are
a passport to a series of other rights and duties which may range from
the right to vote to the requirement of military service. In a General
Recommendation interpreting the Women's Convention, the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) considered that: "Nationality is critical to full participation in
society ... Without status as nationals or citizens, women are deprived
of the right to vote or to stand for public office and may be denied access
to public benefits and a choice of residence"'00
While nationals within the state potentially enjoy full citizenship
rights, non-nationals are traditionally regarded as aliens. The treatment
of aliens depends, among other things, on whether the state in question
accepts that there is an "international minimum standard" of treatment
which must be accorded to all aliens by the state, irrespective of how it
treats its own nationals, or takes the position that aliens may only insist
on those rights which the state grants to its own nationals.'"' Apart from
96. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supra note 84, art. 8.
97. See, e.g., Canepa v. Canada, Communication No. 558/1993, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993, in 5 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 69 (1998); Stew-
art v. Canada, Communication No. 538/1993, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993, in 4 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 418 (1997); Winata v. Australia, Com-
munication No. 930/2000, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/
930/2000 (2001).
98. For a recent case, see Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., Aug.
2, 2001, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Language=en&Advanced=1.
See also infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
99. See Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of Na-
tionality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519, 538-43 (2000).
100. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, in Report of the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (13th Sess.), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 38, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994) [hereinafter General Recommendation 21 on
Equality in Marriage and Family Relations].
101. See Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 252,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
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whatever treatment they are guaranteed as aliens, 0 2 non-nationals may
also be entitled to certain international human rights within the state
based on their residence or even their presence within the jurisdiction.
This impact of international human rights' °3 has led to the mooting of
new forms of citizenship, from "denationalized" to "transnational" to
"postnational. '"' ° Predictions of the demise of nationality as the basis for
intra-state rights, however, rely mainly on the Western experience, par-
ticularly that of Western Europe. Worldwide, the impact of international
human rights on the rights of non-nationals and the more general will-
ingness to accord such rights have been uneven. In addition, the rights of
non-nationals, whether under international human rights law or the na-
tional constitution, often depend on access to the courts, which may be
impractical or impossible in many situations. Lastly, even in the Western
European context, nationality has grown in importance because Euro-
pean Union (EU) nationals enjoy a range of benefits in EU states that
other non-nationals do not. Inside the state as well as outside, therefore,
nationality is still the broadest and most secure foundation for rights.
B. Bases for Nationality
Nationality can be obtained by a number of means. The two princi-
ples on which nationality is awarded at birth are jus sanguinis and jus
soli. Where the state in question follows the principle of jus sanguinis,
an individual's nationality is determined by descent from a national. His-
torically, this principle took the patrilineal form of tracing the
individual's nationality only through the father's line. °5 Where the prin-
ciple is jus soli, the individual is a national of the state simply by being
born within the state's territory, irrespective of the parents' nationalities.
While this principle is superficially neutral, it favors the father's nation-
ality insofar as women have traditionally tended to reside in their
102. State responsibility for the treatment of aliens is considered an antecedent of the in-
ternational law of human rights, although it continues to exist alongside it. Louis Henkin,
International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 REC. DES COURS 13, 209 (1989).
103. But compare YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994) (seeing the positive impact of international
human rights on the rights of aliens nationally) with Christian Joppke, The Evolution of Alien
Rights in the United States, Germany, and the European Union, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra
note 43, at 36, 36-37 (arguing that the trend toward greater rights for aliens is not well ex-
plained by the impact of international human rights on national law).
104. See, e.g., Symposium, The State of Citizenship, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447
(2000).
105. The Israeli Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, as amended by the Law of Return
(Amendment No. 2), 1970, 24 L.S.I. 28, § 4B, is a notable exception in this regard. See
Shachar, supra note 56, at 244-46.
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husband's state. The vast majority of states have adopted an approach
which is a combination of these principles.
Other than at birth, nationality may be acquired by naturalization. It
is for the state to stipulate the requirements that must be satisfied before
a non-national can apply to be naturalized. The philosophy behind the
requirements, which generally include the passage of time and the estab-
lishment of residence within the state, is expressed by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in its 1984 Advisory Opinion on
amendments to the naturalization provisions of the Constitution of Costa
Rica. "In these cases," the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated,
"nationality no longer depends on the fortuity of birth in a given territory
or on parents having that nationality; it is based rather on a voluntary act
aimed at establishing a relationship with a given political society, its cul-
ture, its way of life and its values."' ' Traditionally, this notion of
naturalization as the voluntary establishment of a relationship with the
state had to be reconciled, however, with the fact that marriage to a na-
tional was a basis for automatically granting nationality to a non-national
woman. One way that the two were reconciled was through the idea that
women consented to membership in the polity not directly, but indirectly
as part and parcel of their consent to marriage."7 As Anne McClintock
observed: "For women, citizenship in the nation was mediated by the
marriage relation within the family '"' 8
Where nationality is acquired by naturalization, it is clear that the
rules for entry to a state control who will in future be eligible to be a
national. The immigration law of each state lays down the requirements
for admission. In many states, nationality law is therefore entangled
with, and even based upon, the law of immigration. There is no
uniformity in the principles upon which states have based their criteria
for admission. The factors which may be taken into account include a
person's language, religion, political beliefs, place of birth, connections
to the state, the closeness of family relatives who already reside there,
financial position, ethnicity, color, existing nationality, and sex. Since
each state has wide discretion in its choice of such factors, its history,
economic situation, culture, and political climate will determine which
individuals will be granted immigration clearance and possibly
nationality in the future. Individuals may be perceived as undesirable, for
106. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization
Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4, 35
(1984), reprinted in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 161, 168 (1984), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/b 11 4d.htm [hereinafter Costa Rica Advisory Opinion].
107. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
108. ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE
COLONIAL CONTEXT 358 (1995).
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example, if they are considered likely to be a burden upon the resources
of the state. In fact, the vast majority of states grant "primary
immigration" clearance only to those who can sustain themselves and
bring some benefit to the state. Women have until recently almost always
been viewed either as a burden, and therefore unworthy of citizenship on
their own merits, or as the appendages of men.
III. ANALYZING WOMEN'S EQUALITY IN NATIONALITY LAW
The previous Part of the article provided a general introduction to
the current concept of nationality and bases for its attribution, with an
emphasis on the potential disadvantages for women. When Chrystal
Macmillan addressed the ILA in 1923, however, she was concerned with
those nationality laws that discriminated explicitly against women. The
article accordingly turns next to the issues of women's equality raised by
the discriminatory nationality laws of Macmillan's time and their reform.
This Part divides the issues into three generations. The first-
generation issue is defined as the issue of a married woman's right to an
independent nationality. The second generation of issues involves those
inequalities that come to the fore once a married woman has a national-
ity independent of, and hence potentially different from, her husband's
nationality. Although a third generation of equality issues has not yet
taken shape, this Part suggests some remaining areas of concern for
women.
Since women's nationality is governed by both domestic and interna-
tional law, the issues will differ from state to state and region to region.
Although independent nationality for married women is now widely ac-
cepted, there are still states that maintain reservations or interpretive
declarations to article 9(1) of the Women's Convention, which provides
that women have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their
nationality and, in particular, that neither marriage to an alien nor change
of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change
the nationality of the wife, render her stateless, or force upon her the na-
tionality of the husband. While the second generation of issues is most
prominent in the contemporary caselaw, these successes may be com-
promised in ways that raise a third generation of issues.
A. First-Generation Issue of Equality: Nationality of Married Women
Until the First World War, the nationality laws of virtually all coun-
tries made a married woman's nationality dependent on her husband's
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nationality.' 9 The first of Virginia Woolf's three clarion phrases in her
1938 political work Three Guineas-"as a woman, I have no country. As
a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole
world"-is a bitter allusion to British nationality laws of the day which
deprived a woman of British nationality on her marriage to a foreigner."
The principle of dependent nationality, also called the principle of the
unity of nationality of spouses, rested on the conviction that a family
should have the same nationality and on the patriarchal notion that the
husband should determine that nationality."'
On this principle, a woman who married a foreign national lost her
own nationality and acquired that of her husband simply by virtue of
marriage. If her husband's nationality changed or was lost during the
marriage, her nationality altered accordingly. Moreover, divorce could
render a woman stateless. In many cases, women became stateless with-
out even being aware of it.
The principle of dependent nationality affected women of all classes,
although the impact on women differed with their social class. Having
lost their own nationality upon marriage, women did not have the right to
return to or remain in their home country, since those rights are a func-
tion of nationality. If they did live there, it was without the civil,
political, economic, and social rights attached to nationality. The lack of
economic and social benefits was especially serious for poor and work-
ing-class women. Despite the fact that she lived in her own country, a
widow who had lost her U.S. citizenship on marriage was denied public
assistance for herself and her children, and faced with deportation as a
public charge."2 Similarly, where a woman who had become a U.S. citi-
zen by marriage later divorced and returned to her home country, public
responsibility for her medical care became a diplomatic issue."3 For
middle- and upper-class women, the citizenship rights at stake were
more often the hard-won right to vote or protections for property.'
4
In the history of U.S. citizenship law, for instance, the principle of
dependent nationality did not, however, apply to women of all races.
Marriage to a U.S. citizen did not naturalize a woman who was racially
ineligible for naturalization; originally, any non-white woman and later
109. MAKAROV, supra note 42, at 119.
110. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN AND THREE GUINEAS 234 (Mich~le Bar-
rett ed., Penguin Books 1993) (1938).
111. See Costa Rica Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4, 64; U.N.
DEP'T OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CONVENTION ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED
WOMEN: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND COMMENTARY at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/389, U.N.
Sales No. 62.IV.3 (1962) [hereinafter HISTORICAL BACKGROUND].
112. BREDBENNER, supra note 8, at 1.
113. Id. at 27-28.
114. Id. at 1-2, 65, 68.
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any woman who was not white, of African descent or nativity, or Native
American (with the exception of certain tribes).
1 5
Given that the principle of dependent nationality created problems of
both practicality and principle, it was open to reformers to address the
practical problem of women's statelessness and leave aside the problem
of women's inequality. Indeed, the ILA at its 1924 Conference chose to
deal with the nationality of married women as a problem of conflicts
among the nationality laws of different states and not, as Chrystal Mac-
millan had hoped, as a problem of inequality. In comparison, the IWSA
draft convention that she proposed to the ILA provided not only for the
prospective application of the principle of independent nationality, but
for the restoration of women's nationality lost through the principle of
dependent nationality.'
6
B. Second-Generation Issues of Equality
1. Ability to Pass Nationality to Children
In arguing for the independent nationality of women at the 1923 ILA
Conference, Ernest Schuster could assure the Conference that no claim
had been made that "the wife, being allowed independence as regards
her own nationality, might as a result claim that the children's nationality
should also depend on hers."" 7 As the Unity Dow case indicates, this
claim is precisely the sort of equality issue that followed from the recog-
nition of independent nationality for women.
Traditionally, the husband's nationality determined the nationality of
the children of the marriage, as well as the nationality of the wife. And
similar to the structure of justification for the wife's dependent national-
ity, some of the reasons for not enabling a mother to give her nationality
to her children rested on ideas of nationality, ideas of womanhood, and
the relationship between these ideas. In opposing a mother's right to pass
her nationality on to her children, a right finally recognized in Britain in
the 1981 Nationality Act, Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch
Powell relied on the notion that a man's duty to fight for his nation in
time of war is the ultimate test of nationality."' The stereotype of women
as devoted to "the preservation and care of life" meant that women were
115. Id. at 16-17, n.3. As Leti Volpp argues, the intersection of race and gender in the
structuring of U.S. citizenship law over time is a history that needs to be explored more fully.
Leti Volpp, Dependent Citizens and Marital Expatriates (working title), Presentation at the
Columbia Law School International Law Workshop (Apr. 3, 2001).
116. 32D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 1, app. at 46.
117. Id. at 20-21.
118. 997 PARL DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1981) 966. See also Benner v. Canada (Secretary of
State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358,403.
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incapable of demonstrating the love of country that would entitle them to
pass its nationality on to their children. Even now, Ayelet Shachar ar-
gues, this idea of civic virtue as military virtue excludes Israeli women
from recognition as full citizens of Israel. The Israeli paradigm of the
citizen as soldier means that women are, to some degree, lesser citizens
of Israel because although both men and women are obliged to perform
military service, women can be exempted if they are wives or mothers."9
In states where nationality is determined wholly or partly by descent
from a man of that nationality, a woman's legal inability to convey her
nationality to her child is one of the main issues of women's equality and
nationality. In a comment on the Malkani case, Lubna Mariam describes
the dissonance between a mother's teaching her national identity to her
children and her powerlessness to convey it legally to them:
Mothers may croon Bangla ghoom pardani lullabies at their
child's cradle, guide them through their first Bangla rhymes, en-
join them to love Sonar Bangla; mothers may even send their
sons and daughters to lay their lives for Bangladesh, if need be;
but mothers, in Bangladesh, cannot give their children the right
to call themselves Bangladeshis.2 0
A mother's inability to pass on her nationality to the children may
also cause problems of residency, mobility, and access to state benefits
such as those presented in Unity Dow. In the Malkani case, a court-
appointed amicus curiae argued that another consequence of denying
Bangladesh citizenship to the child of a Bangladesh mother and foreign
father was the effective denial, in the event of separation or divorce, of
the mother's preferential rights of custody of children of tender years
because the children would not be assured of the visas and visa renewals
necessary for them, as non-citizens, to reside with her in Bangladesh.'
2'
Ruth Donner points to the possibility for "legal kidnapping" in the
situation where divorced parents have different nationalities and the
mother has custody of the child in her state of nationality. If the child has
only the father's nationality, then the mother's state of nationality has no
standing to intervene diplomatically where the child is concerned. Thus,
if the father abuses his visitation rights by taking the child back to his
state of nationality, the mother's state cannot exercise its right of
119. Shachar, supra note 56, at 259-63.
120. Mariam, supra note 55.
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Dr. Kamal Hossain at 2, 3(c), Malkani v. Secretary of the
Ministry of Home Affairs of Bangladesh (Bangl. Sup. Ct., High Ct. Div., Dhaka 1997) (Writ
Petition No. 3192 of 1992) (uncertified copy on file with authors).
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diplomatic protection to recover the child.'22 Lastly, if children can only
receive their father's nationality, they will be stateless if the father is
himself stateless or unknown.
Some states may make a distinction between children born inside
and outside marriage. If it is the case that mothers can never convey their
nationality to their children and also that fathers can only convey their
nationality to their children born within marriage, then children of un-
married parents, lesbian couples, and single mothers' 23 are left stateless.
As Nguyen demonstrates, however, some states give the mother's and not
the father's nationality to nonmarital children. The dissenting Justices in
Nguyen traced this policy in U.S. nationality law historically to the as-
sumption that fathers are the natural guardians of legitimate children and
mothers are the natural guardians of illegitimate ones.' 24 If the concern
with gender discrimination in the case of married mothers is a lack of the
parental rights and resources associated with nationality,' 25 the concern
here is the unmarried mother's surfeit of duties. In arguing that women
and men should have the same ability to transmit their citizenship to
their children, American feminists of the 1930s recognized that the prac-
tice of allowing unmarried mothers to transmit their citizenship to their
children was predicated on and reinforced the law's allocation of full
responsibility for nonmarital children to women. Equalizing unmarried
men's and women's abilities to pass citizenship, they claimed, would
help to remedy the unequal allocation of parental duties.
26
2. Naturalization Procedures
Since it was traditionally assumed that a wife would live in her hus-
band's state,12 some states replaced the regime of dependent nationality
122. DONNER, supra note 95, at 200. For one such narrative, see Assia Djebar, A Sen-
tence of Love, 59 GRANTA 49 (1997). It should be noted that dual nationality for the child does
not solve this problem (unless, perhaps, an argument can be made based on the child's effec-
tive nationality). Resort must instead be had to other international conventions.
123. Even if the children of a single mother have her nationality, there may still be na-
tionality-related problems stemming from the role of the father as head of the family in some
legal systems. See, e.g., Nawakwi v. Attorney General of Zambia, [1993] 3 Law Rep.
Commonwealth 231 (Zambia H. Ct.) (single mother successfully challenged the requirement
that she obtain the father's consent before she could include her children in her passport or
they could obtain their own passport).
124. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2075-76 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
125. See, e.g., Corte cost., 28 gen. 1983, n.30, 62 Racc. uff. corte cost. 1983, LXII, 157
(Italy) (unofficial translation provided by Alessandra Prioreschi).
126. Collins, supra note 32, at 1694-98.
127. See Macmillan's comments in 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 39. For
an indication of U.S. statistics that support this assumption factually, see Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 23, 24 (1997).
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for married women with a special procedure for a foreign wife to acquire
her husband's nationality by naturalization or to acquire residency
status... in her husband's state.' 9 The 1957 Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women, in fact, envisages "specially privileged naturalization
procedures" for foreign wives.'3° In several international' and domestic
cases over the last two decades, however, these rules have been found to
violate the right of nondiscrimination. It is this discrimination against
foreign husbands seeking nationality or residency that has become the
other second-generation equality issue.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that even identical
naturalization procedures for women and men may discriminate against
women. In practice, many states require, among other things, personal
interviews to test a person's competence in the language of the state be-
fore nationality is granted. This may be especially burdensome for
women who have not had the opportunity to learn a language because
they have remained within the home while the men have gained em-
ployment and pursued outside interests, thereby affording them greater
opportunity to learn the language. 3 2 Discussing why elderly immigrants
to the United States have much lower rates of naturalization than
younger immigrants, Joan Fitzpatrick points to such obstacles to citizen-
ship as "a lack of knowledge of U.S. civics and English, a reluctance to
adjust to a new culture, emotional problems stemming from redefined
128. Although the case law has involved both naturalization and residency status, the fo-
cus here will be on naturalization.
129. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN
at 15-18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/254/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 64.IV.1 (1963) [hereinafter NATION-
ALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN].
130. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, art. 3, 309
U.N.T.S. 65.
131. See infra Part IV.C.
132. See, e.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1261 on
the Situation of Immigrant Women in Europe 3 (1995):
The Assembly is concerned by the situation of immigrant women, a large number
of whom live on the margins of society and are confronted by more serious difficul-
ties than those facing immigrant men. When they are married, they are often
confined to the home doing housework and isolated from the local community,
without real opportunities to learn the language of the host country, thus further ag-
gravating their isolation. When they are employed, they are often doing menial jobs
unconducive to greater autonomy or to their integration into the host society.
Available at http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta95/erec 1261.htm.
According to the Dutch Working Group on Feminism and International Law, the Dutch
citizenship requirements regarding proficiency in Dutch and sufficient integration into Dutch
society make it generally harder for foreign women, especially those from Islamic countries
who are often more isolated, to become Dutch citizens than it is for foreign men. Letter from
Maria Laeticia P. Loenen, Dutch Working Group on Feminism and Int'l Law, to Christine
Chinkin, Chair, Comm. on Feminism and Int'l Law, Int'l Law Ass'n 2 (Oct. 11, 1999) (on file
with authors).
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roles within the family, increased difficulty in acquiring a second lan-
guage at an advanced age, and age-related impediments to access to
language or civics classes.' 33 She notes that these obstacles may be even
greater for those elderly female immigrants who are illiterate in their
first language and have little or no formal education.
34
C. Third-Generation Issues of Equality
In addition to a patriarchal idea of the family, the principle of de-
pendent nationality of married women rested on the conviction that the
family should have the same nationality. However quaint or outmoded
this conviction, it served the practical purpose of securing the unity of
the family legally through a common nationality. And thus far, ridding
nationality law of its patriarchal foundation has come at some cost to the
unity of the family. In particular, where one spouse is a national of the
state where the family lives and the other is not, the foreign spouse will
always lack the security, entitlements, and benefits which that state at-
taches to nationality.
Furthermore, the adjustments made by families in these situations
may turn out to reproduce the old patriarchal outcome. Depending on the
rights extended to non-nationals by that state, the only viable option for
the foreign spouse may be to become a national by naturalization. If the
two states involved do not both permit dual nationality, however, natu-
ralization amounts to the forced renunciation of that spouse's own
nationality. It also prevents that spouse from passing his or her own na-
tionality to the children. And since it is more often the woman who is
thus confronted with the need to give up her nationality and take her
spouse's nationality, the effect is similar to the old principle of dependent
nationality.
This scenario suggests that the achievement of equality in nationality
law may involve either rights for non-national family members (the func-
tional alternative); or the right of one spouse to acquire the nationality of
the other or to the facilitation of the acquisition of that nationality, to-
gether with the right to dual nationality for the family (the dual
nationality alternative).
While the functional alternative of rights for non-national family
members will be raised in the course of Part IV, the rights of non-
nationals generally is a fast-growing topic in the citizenship literature,'35
and we do not attempt a summary here.
133. FITZPATRICK, supra note 127, at 41.
134. Id.
135. See sources cited supra notes 103-04.
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As regards the first step of the dual nationality alternative, the Inter-
national Woman Suffrage Alliance draft convention presented to the ILA
in 1923 remarkably contains a provision that special facilities should be
given to one spouse to acquire the nationality of the other.3 6 Although a
number of states do facilitate a spouse's acquisition of nationality,137 cur-
rent international law does not recognize either the right of one spouse to
acquire the nationality of the other or the right to the facilitation of its
acquisition.18 The United Nations Human Rights Committee, Inter-
American Court, and European Court of Human Rights have all found
discriminatory the special treatment for foreign wives that often replaced
the prior legal regime of dependent nationality for married women. But
while a state must provide such treatment to foreign wives and foreign
husbands equally if it provides it to either, the state is under no obliga-
tion to provide special treatment in the first place. Legal challenges may
therefore result not in the extension of special treatment to foreign hus-
bands, but in its withdrawal altogether. In response to a case challenging
British immigration rules as discriminatory under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the British government changed the immigration
rules so that it became as hard for foreign wives to join their husbands
settled in Britain as it already was for foreign husbands to join their
wives. 19
Moreover, anything short of an automatic right to acquire the other
spouse's nationality involves some waiting period, during which the
spouse seeking nationality is excluded from the protection and benefits
of that nationality,'O and may be vulnerable to, for example, deportation
and separation from his or her children. As the U.S. example shows with
respect to immigration status, any facilitation of the acquisition of na-
tionality that depends on marriage to a national gives the national spouse
control over the non-national spouse and thus also creates the risk that
136. 32D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, app. at 46.
137. Examples of countries that have specific provisions on marriage include Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Nether-
lands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 43, at 17, 24.
138. DONNER, supra note 95, at 239. Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Proposed Amend-
ments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 4, T 59 (1984), reprinted in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 161, 173 (1984), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b 11_4d.htm.
139. See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text. This is not to say that there are no
international law standards on family reunification. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, The Application of
Contemporary Standards of International Law to Cases involving Separation of Husband and
Wife as a Consequences of Administrative Action by the Israeli authorities in the Occupied
Territories, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 113 (1990/91).
140. Cf. Costa Rica Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. A No. 4, 46.
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the non-national spouse, most often the wife, may endure domestic
abuse in order to acquire nationality. The following cases were docu-
mented at the time when U.S. immigration law required the citizen or
permanent resident spouse to bring a petition for the foreign spouse to
become a resident and did not yet allow exceptions for domestic abuse:
A woman from the Philippines was abused by her U.S. citizen
spouse. He threatened to have immigration authorities deport her
to the Philippines if she tried to leave him. She stayed. He later
cut her all over her back, head, and hands with a meat cleaver.
A U.S. citizen never filed a petition for his Ecuadorian wife even
though he had been married to her for three years and she was
pregnant. She therefore could not gain legal status.
A Dominican woman fled from her U.S. citizen husband's vio-
lent assaults only after being hospitalized for the fifth time as a
result of his beatings. Her husband bashed her head against the
wall and threatened to kill her if she told her doctor what hap-
pened. She had been afraid to leave him because he controlled
her immigration status."'
The second step in the dual nationality alternative for realizing
equality in nationality law is the right to dual nationality, at least for
families of mixed nationality. States have traditionally been opposed to
dual nationality and have taken various international legal measures to
reduce or eliminate cases of dual nationality. Insofar as this aversion re-
lates to such practical problems as which of two states is entitled to
represent an individual in an international claim, it may be lessened by
the development of rules for dealing with such situations.4 1 Insofar as
the state's concern with dual nationality is divided loyalty-on the dubi-
ous assumption that reducing dual nationality, in fact, reduces torn
loyalties-it will not necessarily be persuasive to point to a trend primar-
ily among Western states or between friendly states toward the
acceptance of multiple nationality.' 43 At the same time, it is important to
141. Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacy of Coverture, in
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 380, 380 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997). Regarding
changes to U.S. immigration law intended to eliminate the potential for domestic abuse, see
id. at 383-84; Violence Against Women Act, 114 Stat. 1464, §§ 1504-1507 (2000). See also
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, GENDER ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE PROTECTION LEGISLATION AND POLICY 5-6 (1999) (submission to Citizenship and
Immigration Canada Ad Hoc Committee on Gender Analysis of the Immigration Act dis-
cusssing negative impact of sponsorship).
142. On such rules, see supra notes 79, 89, and 92 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community
in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 378-82 (1996); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality
and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1457-58 (1997).
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attend to the issues of who tends to raise concerns of divided loyalties-
women or men-and whether these concerns are raised wherever appli-
cable or primarily where they work to the disadvantage of women.
Although the dual nationality approach to third-generation issues of
women's equality in nationality law finds little obvious support in cur-
rent international law, there are several possible grounds of argument.
One is the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, which is unusual
in promoting the acquisition of one spouse's nationality by the other
spouse and further in accepting dual nationality. The history of the Con-
vention suggests that this solution is seen as reconciling gender equality
with the traditional European notion of the legal unity of the family pre-
viously encoded in nationality law.'"
Rather than operating on a neutralized version of the patriarchal
family in nationality, equality might operate on a relational conception of
the individual and her rights. An argument for either the functional or the
dual nationality approach to third-generation equality issues would be
that a woman's right to equality in nationality law must be interpreted
relationally, that is, incorporating her interdependency with others. 45 Re-
cent African case law on nationality and immigration. suggests such a
conception. In Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, 46 the Constitutional
Court of South Africa found that the general discretion to deny a tempo-
rary residence permit to an individual who is married to a South African
citizen or permanent resident and seeks permanent residence in South
Africa violated that individual's constitutional right of dignity 47 because
it impaired her ability to achieve personal fulfillment through her rela-
tionship with another, specifically her ability to give effect to her
marriage through cohabitation. 48 In light of South Africa's past, the
Court was acutely aware that the possibilities for spouses to live together
are shaped by factors including poverty 14 and, historically, race.50 Ac-
cordingly, it refused to assume that where a temporary residence permit
is denied, the spouses would both be able to move abroad. In recogniz-
ing the importance of marriage to the right of dignity, the Court valued
the relationship "at least in part because human beings are social beings
144. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, NATIONALITY OF SPOUSES OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES
AND NATIONALITY OF CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK: RESOLUTIONS (77)12 AND (77)13 AND
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 8 (1977).
145. See Knop, supra note 43.
146. Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (SA CC). See also Boony-
sen v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2001 (7) BCLR 645 (SA CC) (with respect to work permits
for the foreign spouses of South Africans).
147. Dawood, 2000 (8) BCLR 837, 1 58.
148. Id. 37.
149. Id. [ 39, 51.
150. Id. 37 n.61.
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whose humanity is expressed through their relationships with others."''
"Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu," the Court noted, "a person is a person
because of other people."'
5 2
Along relational lines, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe found that a
woman's freedom of movement was impaired if her foreign husband was
not legally able to reside permanently with her in Zimbabwe or to work
there.'53 The Botswana Court of Appeal in Unity Dow similarly accepted
that Unity Dow's mobility rights were limited if she could not travel with
her children absent their father because the children had his nationality
and not hers. Judge President Amissah wrote, "the courts are not entitled
to look at life in a compartmentalised form, with the misfortunes and
disabilities of one always kept separate and sanitised from the misfor-
tunes and disabilities of others', 54 The Zambian High Court also relied
on the mother's constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement in
finding it unconstitutional to require the consent of the father before a
mother can include her children in her passport or before they can obtain
their own passport."5
Another line of argument for facilitating dual nationality or some
equivalent for spouses of different nationalities might be possible within
an equality framework such as the Women's Convention. The focus here
would be more on the inequality of what otherwise amounts in effect to
the dependent nationality of women, rather than on the legal vulnerabil-
ity of the family unit or relationships. The Women's Convention supports
this line of argument insofar as the Convention defines discrimination
against women to include discriminatory effect.
To the extent that third-generation equality issues involve some idea
of the family or some idea of the relationships significant to the individ-
ual, discrimination in the idea of the family or relationships becomes an
issue. "In recognizing the importance of the family" the South African
Constitutional Court cautioned in Dawood, "we must take care not to
entrench particular forms of family at the expense of other forms.'
5 6
Some authors argue that what constitutes a family is taken for granted
151. Id. 30.
152. Id. 30 n.42.
153. Kohlhaas v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1998 (6) BCLR 757 (Zimb.);
Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (2) SA 182 (Zimb.); Salem v. Chief
Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (4) SA 280 (Zimb.).
154. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1992] Law Rep. Commonwealth
(Const.) 623, 659 (Bots. C.A.).
155. Nawakwi v. Attorney General of Zambia, [1993] 3 Law Rep. Commonwealth 231
(Zambia H. Ct.).
156. Dawood, 2000 (8) BCLR 837, 31.
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and tends, in fact, to be the traditional Western idea of a nuclear family.'57
This may create problems for same-sex relationships, unmarried couples,
and marriages according to non-Western cultures (for example, "ar-
ranged marriages"). In another case, for example, the South African
Constitutional Court found that legislation facilitating the issuance of an
immigration permit to foreign spouses of South Africans, where
"spouse" referred to a marriage under civil or customary law, was un-
constitutional because it discriminated against same-sex couples.'58 In
this connection, however, it is important to note that not all lesbian
women would favor legal changes that require them to identify their rela-
tionships as family. In the North American debate over family status for
lesbian and gay relationships, some lesbians and gays take the position
that their relationships should be recognized as family and accorded the
same rights and benefits. But others argue that lesbian and gay relation-
ships should not be legally defined as family, for reasons ranging from
the obscuring of important differences between these and heterosexual
relationships to the rejection of the family as an institution oppressive for
159women.
"Arranged marriages" and other forms of family found in non-
Western cultures raise similarly complex issues. In the context of lobby-
ing to change British immigration policy, for instance, women of color
criticized the mainstream women's movement for its implicit condemna-
tion of "arranged marriages." Hazel Carby wrote:
We would not wish to deny that the family can be a source of op-
pression for us but we also wish to examine how ... the black
family has been a site of political and cultural resistance to ra-
cism.
The media's "horror stories" about Asian girls and arranged
marriages bear little relation to their experience. The "feminist"
version of the ideology presents Asian women as being in need
of liberation, not in terms of their own herstory and needs, but
157. Tom Mullen, Nationality and Immigration, in THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF GENDER:
SOME ASPECTS OF SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 146, 162 (Sheila McLean & Noreen Burrows
eds., 1988).
158. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000
(1) BCLR 39 (SA CC), aff'g 1999 (3) BCLR 280 (SA Cape of Good Hope Provincial High
Court). As the Cape High Court pointed out, common-law marriages and Muslim and Hindu
marriages would also be excluded from preferential immigration treatment, although this
exclusion was not challenged.
159. See e.g. Brenda Cossman, Family Inside/Out, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1994); Jody
Freeman, Defining Family in Mossop V DSS: The Challenge of Anti-Essentialism and Interac-
tive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 41 (1994).
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into the "progressive" social mores and customs of the metro-
politan West. 
60
To summarize, as we saw in Part I of the article, most of the current
gender equality challenges to nationality law are challenges to laws that
differentiate between women and men in the attribution of nationality to
children or in the naturalization of spouses. Part III distinguished these
issues as a second generation of equality issues, aimed at securing the
same legal treatment for women as for men in matters of nationality.
Furthermore, Part III showed that while such reforms are important, they
may not be enough. In particular, they may leave families of mixed na-
tionality without the safeguards previously provided by imposing the
husband and father's nationality on the wife and children, and the result-
ing efforts to compensate may in fact compromise women's equality.
This situation raises a third generation of equality issues. To address
them, states need to allow all members of mixed nationality families to
choose dual nationality or otherwise to guarantee sufficient rights and
benefits to the non-national family members, including most especially
security of residency. Part III ended by proposing various justifications
for this result.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIMES
Having determined what gender equality requires, the article next
describes and assesses the historical development of international law as
it relates to women's nationality. Historically, the principle that the
nationality of the wife follows that of the husband was not a principle of
international law. It was a principle that governed the nationality of mar-
ried women in the vast majority of domestic legal systems at the turn of
the century and had already slowly and in piecemeal fashion begun to
change by the time that international law began to regulate the issue in
the 1930s.
International law did not readily approach the issue of women's na-
tionality on the basis of gender equality. It first approached women's
nationality as a problem of statelessness and dual nationality caused by
conflicts among the nationality laws of different states, an approach that
is still found, for example, in states' reservations to the Women's Con-
160. Hazel Carby, White Women Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sister-
hood, in THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: RACE AND RACISM IN 70s BRITAIN 212, 214, 216 (1982).
Regarding immigrant cultures, see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN AND THE LAW,
supra note 141, at 7-8 (noting that for immigrant women, the skills and resources of extended
family members are particularly important as essential support in terms of child care, social
and emotional support, and financial income).
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vention article on nationality. Gradually, international law, and particu-
larly international human rights law, came to deal with women's
nationality as an issue of equality. Most recently, the conclusion of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Children's Convention) 61 and
of two regional conventions on children's rights suggests the need to
pursue the intersection of women's and children's rights of nationality.
Using the three generations of discrimination as a yardstick, this Part
of the article traces the history of the international legal regimes most
relevant to women's equality in nationality law. Parts IV.A and IV.B treat
the development of the public international law rules on nationality, Part
IV.C deals with international women's rights, and Part IV.D involves in-
ternational children's rights. While all of these international legal
regimes are relevant to the campaign for equality, not all are premised on
equality or equality alone. By distinguishing the different regimes and
their different dynamics, Part IV shows the debate and the strategies
generated by each.
A. Inequality
According to a United Nations study, the nationality of the wife fol-
lowed the nationality of the husband in all domestic legal systems in the
world at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, with the ex-
ception of a few Latin American states.'62
If strictly applied, this principle operates so that:
The alien woman marrying a national automatically acquires her
husband's nationality; the woman national marrying an alien
automatically loses her original nationality.
The alien woman whose alien husband acquires the nationality
of the country during marriage acquires automatically his new na-
tionality; the woman national whose husband, a national, loses his
nationality during marriage, automatically loses her nationality.
The alien woman, married to a national, loses her nationality ac-
quired through marriage, upon dissolution of the marriage; the
woman national married to an alien reacquires automatically her




161. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Children's Convention].
162. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 111, at 3.
163. NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 129, at 8.
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This legal regime for the nationality of married women rests on two
premises. The first premise is that all members of a family should have the
same nationality, and the second is that the husband determines what that
nationality is.' 6 Strictly speaking, the first premise does not depend on
gender. At the 1924 ILA Conference, G.M. Palliccia of Italy remarked
jocularly, "let us have one nationality, and, if you like, let us choose the
nationality of the wife, instead of that of the man. There will be perhaps
a certain return to the period of matriarchy, but, after all, the world was
not so bad under matriarchy.'' 65 The second premise relies on a patriarchal
notion of the family, entrenched in the law of the period, which gave the
husband a privileged status and the power to make decisions affecting the
family.
The first premise, that a family should have the same nationality, was
deeply bound up with a vision of the international order as a power
struggle between states. Husband and wife should not have different na-
tionalities because through the powerful attachment of nationality, the
rivalries, tensions, and hostilities that existed between states would be
projected onto the marriage. In his 1929 book on the nationality of mar-
ried women, Trinh Dinh Thao quotes a description of the household with
two nationalities:
a rivalry of nation to nation, interests opposed between persons
united, different affections, diverse fatherlands, enemy wishes
for countries perhaps at war, and this between persons who have
sworn to love one another, between whom everything is com-
mon and who must never leave one another.' 66
Not only would a marriage between people of different nationalities
tend to reproduce the antagonism between states, it would, in turn, give rise
to conflicts between states as the protectors of the respective spouses.' 67
From the premise that a family should have the same nationality, it
followed, to the male mind of the day, that the husband should determine
that nationality. In his manual on private international law, published in
1923, Rend Foignet writes: "[I]t is in conformity with the spirit of mar-
164. See Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provi-
sions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4, 64 (1984),
reprinted in 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 161, 174 (1984), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/b 11_4d.htm; HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 11l, at 3.
165. 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 43.
166. TRINH DINH THAO, DE L'INFLUENCE DU MARIAGE SUR LA NATIONALITE DE LA FEMME
15 (Paul Roubard ed., 1929), quoting Varambon, Nationalitg de la Femme Marije, 8 REVUE
PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANIAIS 50, 56 (1859) (authors' translation).
167. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 229, 311-12 (1915).
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riage that spouses have the same nationality. From that moment, it is
natural that the nationality of the husband spread to the wife."
1 68
Conversely, the premise that the family should have the same nation-
ality can be derived from the idea of the paterfamilias reflected in the
premise that the husband decides the family's nationality. If the wife has
a different nationality, then she will feel a duty of obedience to her coun-
try that rivals her duty of obedience to her husband. She must acquire his
nationality so that he will have no rival for her obedience.
169
If the intertwined concerns of divided loyalty and the preservation of
patriarchy were used to oppose the first-generation equality issue of a
woman's right to choose her nationality independent of her husband,
these concerns, somewhat transmuted, continue to figure in the second
and third generations of equality issues in nationality law. Once the
members of a family can have different nationalities, the concern with
divided loyalty becomes a concern with the prospect that some or all of
them will be dual nationals and therefore subject to conflicting
allegiances. As will be seen,'70 this concern is used as a justification for
the law that only a father can pass nationality to a child. Since the other
second-generation equality issue, equal naturalization procedures for
foreign husbands and foreign wives, does not in and of itself necessitate
allowing the foreign spouse to retain his or her original nationality, it
does not raise the concern of divided loyalty. However, a third-
generation equality analysis points to the possibility that absent the right
to become a dual national, a spouse of one nationality living in the state
of the other spouse's nationality, still most often the wife living in the
husband's state, may effectively have no choice but to become a national
of that state and to renounce her own nationality. Her nationality thereby
follows his and reproduces the very situation that the campaign for the
independent nationality of married women was intended to redress.
The patrilineal justification used historically to justify the unequal
regime of dependent nationality for married women reappears in later
generations of equality issues as a cultural defense, primarily in the
second-generation context of nationality laws that entitle only a father to
pass nationality to a child. In Unity Dow, the Attorney General of
168. RENF FOIGNET, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 80 (6th
ed. 1921) (authors' translation). While Foignet's conclusion may have reflected a wife's legal
duty under the Civil Code to obey the husband and follow him in all his changes of residence,
other French international lawyers maintained that the Code did not apply this duty of obedi-
ence to the wife's nationality because the Code accepted that the husband's nationality could
change over the course of the marriage without the wife's also changing.
169. Makarov, supra note 42, at 166, citing E. Audinet, La nationalitifrangaise, REVUE,
1928, at 30, and Frangois Pelletier, La nationalit6 de la femme mari~e 9 (1925) (thesis, Uni-
versit6 de Dijon).
170. See infra Part IV.B.
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Botswana conceded that the Citizenship Act discriminated against
Botswana women because it allowed only Botswana men to transmit
citizenship to their children, but argued that this discrimination was not
unconstitutional when the constitution was properly interpreted as a
reflection of a patrilineal society. Both customary law and the Roman
Dutch common law in Botswana, the Attorney General argued, were
based upon the paterfamilias as the head of the family. 7'
Judge Amissah, President of the Court, rejected the premise that citi-
zenship must follow the customary or traditional systems of a people,
finding that it was not supported by the development of citizenship law.
In particular, no claim had been made that the British jus soli principle
that prevailed in Botswana prior to independence had interfered with the
male orientation of Botswana customary society. Judge President Amis-
sah reasoned that Botswana nationality in the civic sense need not be the
same as Botswana nationality in the sense of the Botswana people,
which would be a matter of descent through the father. Although Bot-
swana could base its citizenship law on descent, there was no strong
historical reason for it to do so. On the contrary, the constitutional and
international guarantee of equality was a compelling reason for the citi-
zenship law not to follow custom.' Along similar lines, Lubna Mariam,
in a comment on the Malkani case, argues that citizenship is a secular
concept and should be determined separately from personal laws based
on religious predicates.'73
Accepting a linkage of citizenship and culture, a different criticism
of the cultural justification for tracing nationality through the father was
given by a Brussels-based Pakistani woman journalist married to a Span-
ish man and unable, as a woman, to pass her Pakistani nationality to her
171. The Attorney General's Heads of Argument in the High Court and Court of Appeal
cases are reprinted in THE CITIZENSHIP CASE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BOTSWANA V. UNITY Dow, 20-21, 63-65 (Unity Dow ed., 1995).
172. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1992] Law Rep. Commonwealth
(Const.) 623, 641-43 (Bots. C.A.).
173. Mariam, supra note 55. See also Salma Sobhan's criticism of the Malkani decision,
discussed in id.
Even if citizenship is not a secular concept, there is an ongoing discussion in the literature
and within CEDAW on the reinterpretation of Islamic law in ways supportive of women's
equality. For a sense of the literature, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility
Under International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in Hu-
MAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167 (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994); Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, Challenges to the Application ofInternational
Women's Human Rights in the Sudan, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 173, at 397;
Sara Hossain, Equality in the Home: Women's Rights and Personal Laws in South Asia, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 173, at 465. An example of CEDAW's engagement
with the issue is found in its questioning of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Report of the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (13th Sess.), U.N. GAOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994).
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children. She argued that if anything, Pakistani women raising their chil-
dren by a foreign husband outside Pakistan are more likely than
Pakistani men bringing up their children by a foreign wife abroad to en-
sure that the children speak Urdu, know about Islam, and visit Pakistan
as often as possible. If the logic is preservation of culture, then, on this
logic, women are more deserving than men of the right to pass their na-
tionality to their children.
17 4
Also within the framework of respect for culture, the Botswana High
Court in Unity Dow concluded that the country's Citizenship Act actu-
ally introduced a tension between respect for culture and respect for
marriage because the Act made an exception to the patrilineal rule for
children born outside wedlock. By permitting a single mother to give
citizenship to her child, the Act created an incentive for women to live
and bear children outside wedlock. 1
75
B. Statelessness and Dual Nationality
By the time that Alexandre Nikolaevitch Makarov lectured on the
nationality of the married woman at the Hague Academy of International
Law in 1937, 76 the nationality laws of states ranged from those that were
still based on the principle of dependent nationality for married women
to those that had adopted the principle of independent nationality, and
covered a variety of intermediate options. As a result of conflicts be-
tween these different nationality laws, women at the time of marriage or
divorce were increasingly likely to become either stateless 7 7 or dual na-
tionals. If a woman from a state that automatically deprived her of her
nationality on marriage (based on some form of dependent nationality)
married a man from a state that did not automatically grant her national-
ity on marriage (based on some form of independent nationality), then
she became stateless. Conversely, if marriage, under the nationality laws
of her state, had no effect on her nationality (independent nationality)
and marriage, under the laws of her husband's state, gave her his nation-
ality (dependent nationality), then she became a dual national. Similarly,
if the state traced the child's nationality only through the husband (the
174. Why Can't a Woman be Treated Like a Man?, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM
LAWS NEWSHEET (Women Living Under Muslim Laws, London, United Kingdom; Lahore,
Pakistan; Lagos, Nigeria), Mar. & June 1997, at 1. But see note 59 and accompanying text.
175. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1991] Law Rep. Commonwealth
(Const.) 574, 588 (Bots. H. Ct.).
176. Makarov, supra note 42.
177. Statelessness was also caused by other types of conflicts between nationality laws.
For a series of examples, see 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 26-28. For an over-
view of the contemporary causes of statelessness, see Carol A. Batchelor, UNHCR and Issues
Related to Nationality, 14 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 91 (1995).
Summer 20011]
Michigan Journal of International Law
patrilineal form of jus sanguinis), then the child of a stateless, unknown,
or unmarried father would be stateless. It was these "evils of stateless-
ness and double allegiance," rather than women's equality, with which
the ILA's Committee on Nationality and Naturalisation was concerned in
1924. 178
While some solution to the problem of stateless women and children
was clearly needed, the solution of the 1930 Hague Codification Confer-
ence was capable of reproducing the effect of dependent nationality.
The Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws,'7 9 which
emerged from the 1930 Hague Codification Conference held under
League of Nations auspices, is significant as the first international at-
tempt to give every person a nationality.' ° The right to a nationality is
also recognized by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,'8 ' the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1 2 the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 8 3 the
American Convention on Human Rights,8 4 and the European Convention
on Nationality,'85 although the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and
the European Convention on Human Rights make no mention of the
right. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does,
however, include a child's right to a nationality,'86 as do the Children's
Convention 8 7 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child.'88 While the right to a nationality is probably not part of interna-
tional customary law, there does seem to be a customary trend toward the
elimination of statelessness. The only other right of nationality where
some sort of customary consensus seems to exist is the right to change
one's nationality, but different states attach different conditions to its ex-
ercise."'
As concerns the nationality of married women, only one of the four
articles on the subject in the Hague Convention appears to reflect the
178. 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 26.
179. Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 11.
180. Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to Nationality as a Human Right, 12 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
181. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 94, art. 15.
182. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
183. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 94, art. 5(d)(iii).
184. American Convention On Human Rights, supra note 94, art. 20.
185. European Convention on Nationality, supra note 77, art. 4(a).
186. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 49, art. 24(3).
187. Children's Convention, supra note 161, art. 7(1). See also infra Part IV.D.
188. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 1990, art. 6(3), 1 AFR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 295 (1993).
189. See Chan, supra note 180, at 8, 10-11.
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principle of women's equality, as opposed to the aim of reducing state-
lessness and dual nationality. Namely, article 10 provides that
"naturalisation of the husband during marriage shall not involve a
change in the nationality of the wife except with her consent.' ' '9
In contrast, article 8 of the Hague Convention reads: "if the national
law of the wife causes her to lose her nationality on marriage with a for-
eigner, this consequence shall be conditional on her acquiring the
nationality of the husband"' 9 ' The effect of article 8 is that so long as the
husband's state subscribes to the principle of dependent nationality, the
wife's state is also free to apply it. If states increasingly abandon the
principle of dependent nationality, then article 8 would operate so as to
require those states that still accept the principle to increasingly make
exceptions to its application. In and of itself, however, article 8 is neutral
as between the principles of dependent and independent nationality.'92
In a similar vein, a protocol to the Hague Convention gives a mother
the right to pass on her nationality to her child where the child would
otherwise be stateless:
In a State whose nationality is not conferred by the mere fact of
birth in its territory, a person born in its territory of a mother
possessing the nationality of that State and of a father without
nationality or of unknown nationality shall have the nationality
of the said State.
93
Although gender-neutral, the relevant provisions of the Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness, concluded some three decades later,
do not differ significantly in effect."
Thus, developments in international law aimed at solving problems
of statelessness, including those created by the state-by-state reform of
laws on the nationality of married women, did not necessarily promote
the equality of men and women in matters of nationality. Indeed, from
the perspective of women's statelessness, the principle of dependent na-
tionality was basically as satisfactory as the principle of independent
nationality. Problems arose only when the nationality laws of states were
not uniformly based on one principle or the other.
190. On the one hand, a United Nations study states that the purpose of article 10 is ac-
tually to avoid statelessness and dual nationality. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 111,
at 10. On the other, Weis maintains that the principle of equality motivates not only article 10,
but also, to some extent, article 11. WEIS, supra note 73, at 97.
191. See also Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 11, art. 9.
192. See HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 111, at 10.
193. Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, 179
L.N.T.S 115.
194. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 182, arts. 4-6, 8.
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Even now, some states give statelessness as the reason for their res-
ervations or declarations to article 9 of the Women's Convention.
Turkey's declaration states that article 9(1) does not conflict with the
Turkish Law on Nationality "since the intent of the law's provisions
regulating acquisition of citizenship through marriage is to prevent state-
lessness."' 95 Morocco's reservation to article 9(2), which gives women
equal rights with respect to the nationality of their children, is necessi-
tated by its nationality law, which, similar to the Protocol to the Hague
Convention, "permits a child to bear the nationality of its mother only in
the cases where it is born to an unknown father, regardless of place of
birth, or to a stateless father, when born in Morocco, and it does so in
order to guarantee to each child its right to a nationality."
1 96
While statelessness is clearly an important problem for both states
and women themselves, dual nationality is more complicated. Moreover,
while the problem of statelessness admits of nondiscriminatory solu-
tions, the problem of dual nationality does not insofar as states seek a
rule that chooses or forces a choice between the mother's or the father's
nationality, in the case of a child; or between the husband's or the wife's
nationality, in the case of spouses. This makes dual nationality an obsta-
cle to both second- and third-generation equality issues.
States' ingrained opposition to dual nationality generally continues
their concern with divided loyalty, which was used to support the princi-
ple of dependent nationality. This antipathy to dual nationality is clearly
articulated in the preamble to the Hague Convention, which reads in
part:
Being convinced that it is in the general interest of the interna-
tional community to secure that all its members should
recognize that every person should have a nationality and should
have one nationality only;
Recognizing accordingly that the ideal towards which the efforts
of humanity should be directed in this domain is the abolition of
all cases both of statelessness and of double nationality ....
Although there are some indications that states are becoming more toler-
ant of dual nationality,98 this is not a universal trend.
On the assumption that the international order is perpetually on the
verge of war, dual nationality might ill serve the individual as well as the
195. United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treaty9.asp.
196. Id.
197. Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 11, pmbl.
198. See Franck, supra note 143; Spiro, supra note 143.
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state. Wyndham Bewes introduced the 1924 report of the ILA Commit-
tee on Nationality and Naturalisation with the observation that:
double nationality is ... a serious inconvenience, for, if one of
the competing States is at war with the other competing State,
the unfortunate victim would be shot in the chest by one of them
and in the back by the other, and he doubtless would not sur-
vive.' 99
Indeed, the international regulation of dual nationality deals with,
among other things, the military obligations owed by dual nationals.2'
Commentators have argued, however, that the assumption of antagonistic
states is outdated and should no longer prevent the recognition of dual
nationality."'
For women, moreover, dual nationality is used as a reason why only
men can convey their nationality to their children. Egypt explains its res-
ervation to article 9(2) of the Women's Convention in these terms:
This is in order to prevent a child's acquisition of two nationali-
ties where his parents are of different nationalities, since this
may be prejudicial to his future. It is clear that the child's acqui-
sition of his father's nationality is the procedure most suitable
for the child and that this does not infringe upon the principle of
equality between men and women, since it is customary for a
woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children shall
be of the father's nationality.
202
In this connection, Judge President Amissah in Unity Dow disposes
of the dual nationality justification as follows:
the fact that different states follow different criteria in conferring
citizenship means that whatever Botswana provides in its citi-
zenship laws may not achieve the objective of eliminating dual
citizenship, if that indeed is what is desired... In this very case,
the respondent's eldest child, Cheshe, who acquired Botswana
citizenship at birth because her parents were not married at the
time, also became, and presumably still is, an American citizen
by descent. Such a child may continue with this dual citizenship
for the rest of his or her life. But those states which want to
199. 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 23.
200. E.g., Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obli-
gations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 43.
201. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 143.
202. United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHIbible/englishintemetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treaty9.asp.
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avoid dual nationality would then require the child to opt for the
citizenship which he or she wishes to continue with upon attain-
ing majority. The device for eliminating dual citizenship does
not, therefore, appear to me to lie in legislation which discrimi-
nates between the sexes of the parents."'
In a 1983 judgment, the Italian Constitutional Court considered
whether the avoidance of dual nationality justified a 1912 law that did
not give Italian citizenship to the children of Italian women who were
married to non-Italians, but had retained their Italian citizenship. The
Court, which found the law unconstitutional, concluded that the need to
avoid dual nationality was not a valid reason to ignore the articles of the
Constitution on equality before the law without distinction as to sex and
on the moral and legal equality of spouses. According to the Court, the
need to realize the constitutional principle of equality as regards the ac-
quisition of citizenship by birth must take precedence, despite the
serious inconveniences caused by dual nationality. Difficulties arising
from children's dual citizenship could be minimized by legislation.
2°4
If the opposition of states to dual nationality is an obstacle to
women's equal right with men to convey their nationality to their chil-
dren, a second-generation issue of equality, it also relates to the third-
generation issue of the relationship between women's equality and the
protection of the family. Where a woman retains her original nationality
on marriage and chooses to acquire her husband's nationality as well, the
state interest, as evidenced by the 1963 European Convention on Reduc-
tion of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases
of Multiple Nationality,05 has traditionally been to require her to re-
nounce one of the two nationalities. If the wife chooses her original
nationality, however, the family may be divided by discrimination, in
particular as regards residence permits, work permits, foreign travel, and,
in case of separation, the right to see the children regularly.2° But if these
concerns cause the wife instead to acquire her husband's nationality and,
203. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1992] Law Rep. Commonwealth
(Const.) 623, 643-44 (Bots. C.A.).
204. Corte cost., 28 gen. 1983, n.30, 62 Racc. uff. corte cost. 1983, LXII, 157 (Italy). For
subsequent developments in Italian nationality law, see Third Periodic Reports of States Par-
ties: Italy, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at 20, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/ITA/3 (1998).
205. Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations
in Cases of Multiple Nationality, supra note 200.
206. For an example where the different nationalities of divorced spouses limited the fa-
ther's ability to see his children, see Zouhair Ben Said v. Norway, Communication No.
767/1997, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/767/1997 (2000) (Nor-




as a condition, to renounce her own, then the effect is no different than
that of the old principle of the dependent nationality of married
207
women.
For these reasons, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe in 1988 adopted Recommendation 1081, which encourages a
right to dual nationality in the case of mixed marriages. Recommenda-
tion 1081 reads in part:
4. Reaffirming the principle of equality of the spouses before
the law;
5. Considering that, in view of the gravity of the economic and
social problems affecting spouses in mixed marriages, that is
to say marriages where the spouses have a different Euro-
pean nationality, it is desirable that each of such spouses
may have the right to acquire the nationality of the other
without losing his or her own nationality of origin;
6. Considering that the children born from mixed marriages
should also be entitled to acquire and keep the nationality of
both of their parents;
8. Considering that it is only in exceptional cases that the fact
that a person has several nationalities may render difficult
the application of other Council of Europe conventions and
that this can hardly be considered an argument against the
multiple nationality principle .... 208
Several years later, a protocol was concluded amending the 1963
European Convention on the Reduction of Multiple Nationality to the
same effect (the Second Protocol).2 °9
Whereas the 1963 Convention, like the earlier Hague Convention,
treats dual nationality as the twin evil of statelessness, Recommendation
1081 and the Second Protocol thus carve out mixed marriages as an ex-
ception. The 1997 European Convention on Nationality goes even
207. Although both foreign husbands and foreign wives may find themselves faced with
this choice, it still seems to be more often the case that a wife will come to live in her hus-
band's state.
208. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1081 on Problems of
Nationality in Mixed Marriages (1988), reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF LAW: NATIONALITY 76, Doc. DIR/JUR(98)I (1998).
209. Second Protocol Amending the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Feb. 2, 1993, Europ.
T.S. No.149.
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further in that it eliminates the principle of avoiding dual nationality al-
together. The European Convention on Nationality reduces dual
nationality to a problem of co-ordination and bases nationality law in-
stead on the principles of the avoidance of statelessness and equality.
Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention read:
ARTICLE 4- PRINCIPLES
The rules on nationality of each State Party shall be based on the
following principles:
a everyone has the right to a nationality;
b statelessness shall be avoided;
c no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her na-
tionality;
d neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage be-
tween a national of a State Party and an alien, nor the
change of nationality by one of the spouses during
marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of
the other spouse.
ARTICLE 5 - NON-DISCRIMINATION
1. The rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain
distinctions or include any practice which amounts to dis-
crimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin.
2. Each State Party shall be guided by the principle of non-
discrimination between its nationals, whether they are na-
tionals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently.
Under the European Convention on Nationality, it is possible to
achieve equality other than at the expense of family life. Because a state
may permit a family to choose dual nationality, the family can have unity
of nationality, with the security that provides, without sacrificing the na-
tionality of one spouse or the other. In the first place, article 6(1)(a)
provides that a state party shall grant its nationality at birth to children
born to a national within the state, and article 6(4) that a state party shall
"facilitate in its internal law the acquisition of its nationality" for spouses
of its nationals and those children of its nationals who are not already
nationals by birth. In the second, article 14(1) requires states to allow
dual nationality in the case of spouses and children who have automati-
cally acquired more than one nationality by operation of law, and article
15 permits states to allow dual nationality generally.
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If the European Convention on Nationality seeks to reconcile equal-
ity with the safeguarding and support of the family as a social and legal
unit-previously reflected in its single nationality-the European Union
had been concerned with the family as an economic unit and what that
requires by way of rights for the non-national family members of an EU
national. The EU guarantees to the non-EU spouse and family members
of an EU national the right of free movement, the right of residence and
to remain, as well as economic and social rights." ° Although less than
the rights secured by nationality, this package of rights makes it possible
for the non-EU spouse to retain his or her own nationality without jeop-
ardizing the security and well-being of the family.
But the rights of the non-EU spouse are not traditionally understood
to be that spouse's as such. They are traditionally understood as the right
of the EU national to be joined by (as it was assumed) his wife and fam-
ily, a right seen as necessary to ensure the free movement of EU workers.
Accordingly, these rights depend on the existence of the marriage. 2 ' As
in the case of spousal sponsorship for immigration status,2 2 this is prob-
lematic because it gives the EU spouse leverage over the life of his or her
spouse through divorce or even the threat of divorce." 3 Moreover, as Jo-
seph Weiler has argued, it reifies the non-EU spouse: she or he is a thing
that serves the purpose of ensuring the free movement of labor within the
European Union, as opposed to an individual with human dignity who
has established a new life in a new place.24 In this regard, there is now a
proposal in the EU to grant in the event of the dissolution of the mar-
riage an independent right of residence and right of work for the non-EU
family members after a residence period of three and five years, respec-
tively. That is, provided that the non-EU family members satisfy the
residency requirement, the rights they enjoyed by virtue of their relation-
ship to an EU national are not immediately lost on the break-up of the
marriage. The proposal extends beyond spouses to include persons cor-
responding to spouses under the law of the host member state. 2
210. See Tamara Hervey, A Gendered Perspective on the Right to Family Life in Euro-
pean Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 221, 230-32 (Nanette
A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
211. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection
of the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals-A Critique, 3 EuR. J. INT'L L. 65, 90 (1992).
212. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
213. Weiler, supra note 211, at 87.
214. For gender-related criticisms regarding the EU conception of family and work, see
Hervey, supra note 210.
215. Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation Amend-
ing Council Regulation 1612/68 EEC on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the
Community, 1998 O.J. (C 344) 9, amended 1999 O.J. (C 279) 58; Commission Proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive Amending Directive 68/360 EEC on the Abolition
of Restrictions on Movement and Residence Within the Community for Workers and their
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C. Equality
Women in the Americas were the first to succeed internationally in
having women's nationality treated as an issue of equal rights. Created
by resolution of the Sixth Pan American Conference in 1928, the Inter-
American Commission of Women was charged with "the preparation of
juridical information and data of any other kind which may be deemed
advisable to enable the Seventh International Conference of American
States to take up the consideration of the civil and political equality of
women in the continent.' 216 At the Seventh Pan American Conference,
the Commission presented a draft convention that became the 1933
Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Women. Its single substan-
tive provision was contained in article 1, in which the parties declare that
"[t]here shall be no distinction based on sex as regards nationality, in
their legislation or in their practice.
217
Subsequent international instruments that pertain to women's equal-
ity in nationality law may be divided into those dealing with women's
equality in the context of nationality (discussed in Part IV.C. 1) and those
guaranteeing women's equality generally and in the context of other
rights relevant to nationality (discussed in Part IV.C.2).
1. Equality Rights in Nationality Law
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims both the
right of non-discrimination on the grounds of sex28 and the right to a
nationality.29 By reading the two together, it can be argued that the Uni-
versal Declaration prohibits sexual discrimination in the laws awarding
nationality. The 1969 American Convention on Human Rights also in-
cludes both the right to equality220 and the right to a nationality.' In a
1984 Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held
Families, 1998 O.J. (C 344) 12, amended 1999 O.J. (C 279) 61. But see id., proposed article
4(a)(2) (concerning non-economically active family members).
216. Quoted in James Brown Scott, The Seventh International Conference of American
States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 219 (1934).
217. Pan-American Convention on the Nationality of Women (Montevideo Convention
on the Nationality of Women), Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 2957, 2960 (1936). See also
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, arts. II, XIX,
OASOR OEA/Ser.LV/I.4 Rev. (1965), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO Hu-
MAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1992);
Montevideo Convention on Nationality, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 6, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES-SUPPLEMENT 1933-1940 108 (James Brown Scott,
Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace ed., 1940).
218. Universal Declaration, supra note 94, art. 2.
219. Id. art. 15.
220. American Convention On Human Rights, supra note 94, arts. 1(1), 17(4), 24.
221. Id. art. 20.
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that Costa Rica's proposal to amend the naturalization provisions of its
constitution such that a foreign woman who marries a Costa Rican
would be accorded special consideration for obtaining Costa Rican na-
tionality constituted discrimination contrary to article 24 of the
American Convention on equality before the law and article 17(4) on the
equality of spouses.2
Although not directly violating the right to a nationality guaranteed
by article 20 of the American Convention,223 the proposed constitutional
amendment also raised issues bearing on that right.24 In particular, the
amendment was drafted so that
foreigners who lose their nationality upon marrying a Costa Ri-
can would have to remain stateless for at least two years because
they cannot comply with one of the obligatory requirements for
naturalization unless they have been married for that period of
time. It should also be noted that it is by no means certain that
statelessness would be limited to a period of two years only. This
uncertainty results from the fact that the other concurrent re-
quirement mandates a two-year period of residence in the
country. Foreigners forced to leave the country temporarily due
to unforeseen circumstances would continue to be stateless for
an indefinite length of time until they will have completed all the
concurrent requirements established under this proposed
amendment. 5
Despite this result, however, the proposed constitutional amendment did
not violate the woman's right to a nationality because her statelessness
was technically brought about by the nationality laws of her own state
and not the Costa Rican Constitution. 6
In this connection, the Inter-American Court refers to the Conven-
tion on the Nationality of Married Women and the Women's Convention
as reflecting "current trends in international law. 227 The Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women,228 which came into force in 1958,
establishes the independent nationality of a married woman ,229 but
222. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provi-
sions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), reprinted in





227. Id. [ 49. In the view of DONNER, supra note 95, at 209-210, the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women is not declaratory of customary international law.
228. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, supra note 130.
229. Id. arts. 1-2.
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neither a woman's equal right to pass on her nationality to her child nor
that of a foreign husband to special naturalization procedures where such
procedures have been established for foreign wives. On the contrary, by
providing that the foreign wife of a national may, at her request, "acquire
the nationality of her husband through specially privileged naturalization
procedures, 230 the Convention reinforces the assumption that a wife will
follow her husband. "I think probably a very great number of interna-
tional marriages are the other way about," Chrystal Macmillan remarked
at the 1924 ILA Conference, proposing that a foreign husband and a for-
eign wife be given the same special treatment.3
The 1979 Women's Convention goes further than the Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women in several respects. Article 9 of the
Women's Convention reads:
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to
acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure
in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of
nationality by the husband during marriage shall automati-
cally change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless
or force upon her the nationality of the husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with
respect to the nationality of their children.
Like the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the
Women's Convention entrenches the first-generation equality principle
of independent nationality for married women. Article 9(1) also protects
women against statelessness and ensures that they are not forced to take
the nationality of their husband.
Unlike the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the
Women's Convention also addresses the second generation of equality
issues associated with nationality. Whereas the Convention on the Na-
tionality of Married Women is silent on the nationality of children,
article 9(2) grants women and men equal rights in this regard.
While the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women envis-
ages specialized naturalization procedures for foreign wives, it is
generally assumed that the Women's Convention requires the same pro-
cedures for both wives and husbands. Moreover, it may be argued, given
the attention to de facto unions in CEDAW's General Recommendation
dealing with articles 9, 15, and 16 of the Women's Convention, that
whatever procedures apply to wives and husbands should apply to de
230. Id. art. 3. For the drafting history of article 3, see HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra
note 111, at 40-44.
231. 33D CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 39-40.
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facto partners as well. The interpretation of equality in article 9 of the
Women's Convention as requiring identical naturalization procedures for
wives and husbands, and arguably also de facto partners, is consistent
with the Inter-American Court's advisory opinion on the Costa Rican
constitution and also with the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights
Committee and European Court of Human Rights on gender equality in
immigration procedures.232 This interpretation is also consistent with
CEDAW's commentary on article 15(4) of the Women's Convention,
which gives women and men "the same rights with regard to the law re-
lating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their
residence and domicile." '233 In CEDAW's view, article 15(4) requires that
migrant women who live and work temporarily in another country
should be permitted the same rights as men to have their spouses, part-
ners, and children join them.3 It should be noted, however, that article
15 refers to the "same" rights, while article 9 involves the more complex
notion of "equal" rights.
While article 9 of the Women's Convention requires states to equal-
ize the procedures for the acquisition of nationality by the spouse of a
national, it does not go so far as to oblige states to facilitate a spouse's
acquisition of nationality.
The progress represented by article 9 of the Women's Convention is
hampered by the large number of reservations, made by a range of states,
to all or part of that article.235 Although a number of states have entered
objections,236 these objecting states maintain that the Women's Conven-
tion remains in force as between them and the reserving states.3
232. See infra Part IV.C.2.
233. Women's Convention, supra note 46, art. 15(4).
234. General Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, supra
note 100, at 3.
235. For a list, see supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
236. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden. There have also been objections to other reservations which might affect
article 9. United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treaty9.asp.
237. Christine Chinkin has therefore characterized these reservations as "little more than
an official record of displeasure." Christine Chinkin, Nationality in International and Regional
Human Rights Law, Keynote Address at a Judicial Colloquium organized by the U.N. Div. for
the Advancement of Women 15 (Oct. 1999) (on file with authors). Alpha Connelly has
stressed, however, that the reservations have some effect since in its relations with the reserv-
ing state, the objecting state may argue that the Women's Convention is fully in force; that is,
as though the reservation to article 9 had never been made. Should the objecting state seek to
take some action against the reserving state in respect of the reserving state's obligations un-
der article 9, for instance, the objecting state may argue that the reservation is invalid, is not
opposable to it since it objected or both. Letter from Alpha Connelly, Member, Comm. on
Feminism and Int'l Law, Int'l Law Ass'n, to Karen Knop (May 4, 2000) (on file with authors).
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Similarly, while CEDAW has questioned states on their application of
article 9 in the state reporting process and has referred to states' non-
implementation of article 9 in its concluding comments, 23 ' relatively few
states are party to the Optional Protocol that allows CEDAW to hear in-
dividual complaints under the Women's Convention.239
Although not necessarily in article 9, the Women's Convention may
address the third generation of equality issues in nationality law. The
root of these third-generation issues is the possibility that the indepen-
dent nationality of women has left the unity of the family less legally
secure because the family is no longer protected by a common national-
ity. In the more likely scenario where the husband is a national of the
state where the family lives and the wife is not, the family lacks the se-
curity and the wife herself lacks the entitlements and benefits which that
state bases on nationality. Depending on the rights extended to non-
nationals by that state, the only viable option may be for the wife to be-
come a national by naturalization. If the state does not permit dual
nationality, however, then her naturalization amounts to the forced re-
nunciation of her own nationality. As a result, the unity of the family and
the wife's capacity to function in the state where the family lives come at
the expense of her nationality and therefore her ability to convey her na-
tionality to her children. Given that the discrimination against women
prohibited by the Women's Convention extends to laws that discriminate
in their effect, the Convention would likely require this scenario of the
de facto dependent nationality of women to be remedied, whether by
greater rights for non-national family members or by dual nationality for
families of mixed nationality.
2. Equality and Other Rights Related to Nationality
In international human rights instruments that include a right of
equality or non-discrimination, but not specifically in the context of na-
tionality,2 ° the right of equality or non-discrimination may be used,
much as in the Women's Convention, to challenge a state's nationality
law on the ground that it discriminates against women. This is only pos-
sible, though, where the instrument provides for an autonomous equality
238. For a recent example, see Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Jordan, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2000/I/CRP.3/Add. 1/Rev. 1 (2000).
239. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force Dec. 22, 2000).
240. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 49; European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 50. With respect to the European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No.4 to
the Convention, supra note 94, does, however, stipulate some nationality-related rights.
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right, which applies independent of whether another right in the instru-
ment is involved."' Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is an example of an autonomous equality right. In fact,
in its recent General Comment on Equality of Rights Between Men and
Women, the UN Human Rights Committee cites citizenship or the rights
of non-citizens in a country as an example of an area where article 26
protects the right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimi-
nation.242
In contrast to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights have only a subordinate equality
right, which limits their application to discrimination with respect to an-
other right in the instrument. However, Protocol No. 12,243 not yet in
force, adds an autonomous equality right to the European Convention on
Human Rights. And article 18(3) of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights arguably incorporates the Women's Convention by re-
quiring states to "ensure the elimination of every discrimination against
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the
child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions, 2"
thereby removing the limitations of the subordinate equality right.
Where the equality right is subordinate, it can be argued in conjunc-
tion with whatever other right may be affected by the discriminatory
nationality law. In Unity Dow,245 for example, the Botswana Court of
Appeal found that the law that allowed a Botswana father, but not a Bot-
swana mother, to convey Botswana nationality to the children of the
marriage infringed a mother's right to freedom of movement. Because
children of a Botswana mother and a non-Botswana father are aliens in
Botswana, they could be denied re-entry into or residence in Botswana.
Given the nature of the relationship between mother and child, the state's
discretion to exclude such children from Botswana amounts to interfer-
ence with the mother's right to freedom of movement.
241. On autonomous versus subordinate equality rights, see generally Anne F. Bayefsky,
The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1,
3-4 (1990).
242. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28 on Equality of Rights
Between Men and Women (Art.3), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.10, 31 (2000).
243. Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177.
244. A protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the rights of
women in Africa is being drafted. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Le Projet de Protocole A la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des
Peuples relatif aux Droits de la Femme en Afrique, at http://www.unhchr.ch/french/html/
menu2/womenpub2000 fr.htm.
245. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana, [1992] Law Rep. Commonwealth
(Const.) 623 (Bots. C.A.).
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In its General Comment on Equality, the Human Rights Committee
applies the subordinate equality rights in articles 2 and 3 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to article 23(4) on the
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during
marriage, and at its dissolution. It thus glosses the Covenant as requiring
states to ensure that "no sex-based discrimination occurs in respect of
the acquisition or loss of nationality by reason of marriage [and in re-
spect] of residence rights. 246 The Committee also specifies that "[i]n
giving effect to recognition of the family in the context of article 23, it is
important to accept the concept of the various forms of family, including
unmarried couples and their children and single parents and their chil-
dren and to ensure the equal treatment of women in these contexts. 247
The most relevant case decided by the Human Rights Committee is
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius (the Mauritian Women's Case),248
which dealt with the second-generation issue of equal treatment for for-
eign husbands and wives in immigration law. In the Mauritian Women's
Case, a number of Mauritian women submitted a communication to the
Human Rights Committee, in which they argued that amendments to the
Mauritian immigration and deportation laws violated their right to equal-
ity and right to family life under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Up to 1977, spouses, that is, both husbands and wives,
of Mauritian citizens had the right of free access to Mauritius and en-
joyed immunity from deportation. Spouses had the right to be considered
de facto as residents of Mauritius. The amendments limited these rights
to the foreign wives of Mauritian citizens. As a result, foreign husbands
had to apply to the Minister of the Interior for a residence permit and had
no right to appeal to the courts should the permit be refused.
The application of article 17(1) of the Covenant gave Mauritian citi-
zens the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with their family. The Committee found that there had been interference
with the family of those of the Mauritian women who were actually, as
opposed to hypothetically, affected by the changes to the law. They and
their husbands clearly constituted a "family," a common residence was
normal for husband and wife, and the precariousness of the husband's
residence in Mauritius amounted to interference with the family. These
families were unsure of whether and how long they could continue their
life together in Mauritius. Moreover, the delay in processing the applica-
246. General Comment No. 28, supra note 242, 1 25. See also id. 17 (applying the sub-
ordinate equality rights in the Covenant to article 13 on the expulsion of aliens).
247. Id. 127.
248. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, Communication No.35/1978, U.N. Human




tion for a residence permit, a delay of several years in the case of Shirin
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra, prevented the husband from receiving a work per-
mit and therefore from contributing to the family income. Regardless of
whether these restrictions would otherwise have been permissible under
article 17(1), they were not permissible because they discriminated on
the grounds of sex. The Committee therefore found a violation of Cove-
nant articles 2(1) and (3), on non-discrimination and the equal rights of
men and women respectively, in conjunction with article 17(1).
The Committee similarly found a violation of these equality provi-
sions, as well as the provision in article 26 on equality before the law, in
conjunction with the provision in article 23(1) on the protection of the
family. While the legal protection of the family may vary from country
to country and may depend on different social, economic, political and
cultural conditions and traditions, it cannot vary with the sex of the
spouse.
Of the different rights to family life in the European Convention, the
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and found a fam-
ily, contained in article 12, has proved unlikely to provide a basis for any
type of immigration case.249 According to Hugo Storey, "its interpretation
has been dominated by an 'elsewhere' approach which assumes no Arti-
cle 12 infringement can occur so long as an applicant is not prevented
from marrying (or adopting, etc.) abroad., 20 The right to respect for fam-
ily life in article 8 of the European Convention in conjunction with the
right of non-discrimination on grounds of sex in article 14 was success-
fully argued in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United
Kingdom.2 1' In that case, three women-one either stateless or a Malawi
citizen, one a Filipino citizen, and one a citizen of the United Kingdom
and Colonies-challenged the 1980 United Kingdom's Immigration
Rules on the grounds of sex discrimination"2 and interference with fam-
ily life. These Rules, which restricted who could join a spouse or
intended spouse already settled in the United Kingdom, made it more
difficult for a husband or fianc6 to come to the United Kingdom than for
a wife or fianc6e. The United Kingdom conceded that the Immigration
Rules discriminated on the ground of sex, but justified the decision as
249. See, e.g., A.M. Connelly, Problems of Interpretation in Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 35 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.*567 (1986); Jane Liddy, Current
Topic: The Concept of Family Life Under the ECHR, 1998 EUR. HUm. RTs L. REV. 15; Hugo
Storey, The Right To Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg, 39 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 328 (1990); Colin Warbrick, The Structure of Article 8, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 32.
250. Storey, supra note 249, at 342.
251. Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
(1985).
252. Other grounds, including racial discrimination and inhuman or degrading treatment,
were also argued.
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necessary to protect the domestic labor market in a time of high unem-
ployment."3 The Court rejected this justification, finding that the
difference in impact on the labor market as between male and female
immigrants was insufficiently important to justify discriminatory treat-
ment on the basis of sex.254 The response of the British government is
instructive. In 1985, after the European Commission had found that there
was a case for the British government to answer, the government equal-
ized the immigration rules downward.25' That is, rather than making it
253. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at
36. Cf Singapore's general reservation to the Women's Convention:
Singapore is geographically one of the smallest independent countries in the world
and one of the most densely populated. The Republic of Singapore accordingly re-
serves the right to apply such laws and conditions governing the entry into, stay in,
employment of and departure from its territory of those who do not have the right
under the laws of Singapore to enter and remain indefinitely in Singapore and to the
conferment, acquisitions and loss of citizenship of women who have acquired such
citizenship by marriage and of children born outside Singapore.
United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHIbible/englishinternetbible/
partl/chapterIV/treaty9.asp.
In upholding the constitutionality of a provision of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship
Act, No. 26 (1956) that entitled the foreign wife of an Irish citizen to obtain citizenship if she
lodged a declaration accepting Irish citizenship as her post-nuptial citizenship, but allowed the
foreign husband of an Irish citizen to obtain Irish citizenship only by naturalization, which is
at the discretion of the Minister of Justice, the High Court of Ireland held that the provision
had
regard to the social, economic and political conditions which might prevail in the
various jurisdictions from which alien aspirants for citizenship might come. It was
open to the Legislature to take the view that, in some at least of these jurisdictions,
the likelihood of females being engaged on any of the activities which might be
relevant in considering an application for citizenship was sufficiently remote to jus-
tify the automatic granting of citizenship to female aliens upon their marriage to
Irish citizens.
Somjee v. Minister for Justice and Attorney General, [1981] I.L.R.M. 324, 326 (Ir. High Ct.).
Although the High Court did not specify what activities it had in mind, it sought, like the
United Kingdom and Singapore, to justify the preferential treatment of foreign wives on the
basis of assumptions about the different activities of men and women. Several years after this
decision, however, the law was changed to make the conditions for the naturalization of for-
eign spouses the same, irrespective of the sex of the spouse. See Alpha Connelly, The
Constitution, in GENDER AND THE LAW IN IRELAND 7-8 (Alpha Connelly ed., 1993).
Another justification used by states for discrimination in citizenship laws regarding for-
eign husbands of nationals is the prevention of "marriages of convenience." See CEDAW
Report (13th Sess.), supra note 173, 331 (Zambia) and 1695 (Senegal). However, even as-
suming that marriages of convenience always involve women marrying foreign men-an
assumption that is highly questionable-it would be overbroad to target all women marrying
foreign men rather than to take measures aimed specifically at marriage fraud.
254. Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at
38.
255. Mullen, supra note 157, at 159-60.
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equally easy for husbands and fiancds to come to the United Kingdom,
these changes made it equally hard for wives and fiancres to come.
Just as the Human Rights Committee in the Mauritian Women's
Case was not willing to find the immigration restrictions impermissible
absent their discrimination on the ground of sex, the European Court of
Human Rights in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali found no violation
of the right to family life in article 8 taken alone. This suggests that
while the right of equality or non-discrimination in conjunction with
rights such as the right to freedom of movement or the right to family
life have the potential to address the gender-based differentiation in na-
tionality law characteristic of the second generation of equality issues,
they do not necessarily ensure the greater rights for non-national family
members or dual nationality for mixed nationality families identified as
alternative approaches to the third generation of equality issues. How-
ever, the relational interpretation of the right to freedom of movement in
the Kohlhaas line of cases in Zimbabwe256 and of the right to dignity in
the Dawood line of cases in South Africa257 show that such rights by
themselves offer growing protections for non-national family members.
D. Children's Rights
The current momentum behind children's rights in international law
suggests that they may be an effective way to approach the second-
generation equality issue of a woman's right to pass her nationality to
her child and possibly also certain third-generation equality issues. As
with any strategy not centered on the advancement of women's equality,
however, the risk is that effectiveness will come at the cost of subordinat-
ing women's interests to children's interests.
As early as the 1930 Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of State-
lessness,28 the prevention of statelessness among children served as a
reason to give the mother's nationality to the child where the child would
otherwise be stateless. Since then, a number of international human
fights instruments have recognized the child's right to acquire a national-
ity. The right is found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 259 as well as in the newer, specialized conventions such
256. See Kohlhaas v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1998 (6) BCLR 757
(Zimb.); Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (2) SA 182 (Zimb.); Salem v.
Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe 1995 (4) SA 280 (Zimb.).
257. Booysen v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2001 (7) BCLR 645 (SA CC); Dawood v.
Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (SA CC).
258. Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, supra note 193.
259. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 49, art. 24(3).
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as the Children's Convention2'6 and the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child.26'
This growing recognition of the child's right to acquire a nationality
does not, by itself, amount to the recognition of the equal right of both
parents to pass their nationalities to the child. The UN Human Rights
Committee has identified the purpose of the child's right to acquire a
nationality contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as "to prevent a child from being afforded less protection by soci-
ety and the State because he is stateless. 262 As such, the child's right to
acquire a nationality would be satisfied by any nationality. Savitri
Goonesekere argues, however, that, at least as far as the Children's Con-
vention is concerned, the Convention's general articles on gender
equality (art. 2), family and parental rights and responsibilities (arts. 5,
8-10, and 18), and its norm of the best interests of the child (art. 3) re-
quire that if the child's nationality is traced through the parents (jus
sanguinis), then it must be traced equally through both parents.263
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Benner264 ruled unani-
mously that provisions of the Canadian Citizenship Act which treated
individuals claiming citizenship on the basis of their mother's Canadian
citizenship differently from individuals whose claim was based on their
father's Canadian citizenship violated their equality rights as guaranteed
by the Canadian constitution. The first Citizenship Act, passed in 1946,
enabled Canadian fathers to pass Canadian citizenship to their children
born abroad. Except in the case of a child born out of wedlock, Cana-
dian mothers did not have the same ability. A new Citizenship Act,
which came into effect in 1977, removed this distinction for children
260. Children's Convention, supra note 161, art. 7(1).
261. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 188, art. 6(3).
There is also a European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, Jan. 25, 1996,
Europ. T.S. No. 160, the object of which is
in the best interests of children, to promote their rights, to grant them procedural
rights and to facilitate the exercise of these rights by ensuring that children are,
themselves or through other persons or bodies, informed and allowed to participate
in proceedings affecting them before a judicial authority.
Id. art. 1(2).
262. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17 on the Rights of the
Child (Article 24) (35th session, 1989), in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. I at
23, 8 (1994).
263. Goonesekere, supra note 48, at 89-90. The child's right to a nationality may also be
read in light of the Women's Convention.
264. Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; Citizenship Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-29, §§ 3(l)(e), 5(2)(b), 22 (1985) (Can.).
265. For the sake of brevity, the following account of Benner will refer simply to Cana-
dian fathers and Canadian mothers, as opposed to Canadian fathers and unmarried Canadian
mothers, on the one hand, and married Canadian mothers, on the other.
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born outside Canada after the Act came into effect, making them Cana-
dian citizens if either parent was Canadian. For children born abroad
earlier, however, the new Act lessened, but did not entirely remove, the
distinction made by the earlier Act. Children born to a Canadian father
retained their automatic entitlement to citizenship upon registration,
while children born to a Canadian mother could now apply to become
citizens. But whereas children of a Canadian father could claim citizen-
ship simply by registering within a certain time, children of a Canadian
mother were required to apply and, as part of the application process, to
undergo security and criminal record checks and to swear an oath.2'6 If
the checks showed that they had been charged with an offence, then the
Act prevented them from taking the oath, and therefore from becoming
Canadian citizens, until the charges were resolved. If convicted of an
indictable offence, they could not become Canadian citizens for three
years after the conviction. Certain convictions might bar them from ever
becoming Canadian citizens.267
The particular relevance of Benner is the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that a child may have standing to bring an equality challenge to
nationality laws. Benner was born in 1962 in the United States to a Ca-
nadian mother and U.S. father. The Canadian government argued that he
lacked standing because any discrimination imposed by the Citizenship
Act was not imposed on him, but on his mother. The Act did not dis-
criminate against him based on his sex-the Act does not refer to the sex
of the applicant for citizenship-but against his mother based on her sex.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that there was a con-
nection between Benner's rights and the Act's distinction between men
and women. Under the Act, Benner's right to citizenship depended on
whether his Canadian parent was male or female. Therefore, he was the
real target of the provisions and the one with the greatest interest in chal-
lenging their constitutionality. In addition, given the unique link between
parent and child, it was appropriate to thus extend the standing to raise
discrimination on grounds of sex. Where "something so intimately con-
nected to and so completely beyond the control of an applicant as the
gender of his or her Canadian parent" can restrict access to benefits such
as citizenship, the applicant may invoke the constitutional guarantee of
equality.1
68
In addition to the second-generation equality issue of the right of
both parents to pass their nationalities to their children, children's rights
are another functional approach to emerging third-generation equality
266. Benner, [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 377-380.
267. Id. at 394.
268. Id. at 397-401.
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issues. As opposed to protecting the relationship between parent and
child through dual nationality, the Children's Convention does so
through extensive family-related rights for non-nationals. These rights
include the right of the child to know and be cared for by his or her par-
ents (article 7(1)), the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including family relations (article 8(1)), the right of the child whose par-
ents reside in different states to maintain personal relations and direct
contacts with both parents on a regular basis, and, towards that end, the
right of the child and his or her parents to leave any country, including
their own, and to enter their own country (article 10(2)), and the right of
the child to protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or
her family (article 16(1)).
CONCLUSION
In picking up where Chrystal Macmillan left off, this article has not
so much argued for equality as argued from equality. Where equality in
matters of nationality continues to be contentious, the article's contribu-
tion is therefore primarily to highlight the debate, to expand its terms,
and to canvass the practical options that may already be available to
women through international law regimes based on premises other than
equality, such as the avoidance of statelessness or the best interests of the
child.
Where equality is accepted in principle, the article, and in particular
the International Law Association's recommendations, contribute further
by spelling out what equality would require in terms of reform to a
state's nationality law, the rights it guarantees to residents, or both. The
recommendations on women's equality and nationality in international
law that were adopted by the ILA at its 2000 Conference are:
1. The rules of states on nationality should be based on the fol-
lowing principles of international law:
a. the right of everyone to a nationality;
b. the avoidance of statelessness; and
c. nondiscrimination on the basis of sex.
These principles are incorporated in the European Conven-
tion on Nationality.
2. The principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex should
require, as in article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the elimination
of any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
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of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullify-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, on a
basis of equality of men and women, of their nationality and
the rights associated with that nationality.
3. In designating the personal relationships that form the basis
for preferential treatment under immigration and nationality
rules, states should not discriminate on the grounds of sex,
sexual orientation, culture, marital status or any combination
thereof.
4. As provided for in article 9(1) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
and other international human rights treaties, states should
grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or re-
tain their nationality. In particular,
a. states should ensure that neither marriage to a foreign
national nor change of nationality by the husband dur-
ing marriage shall automatically change the nationality
of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the
nationality of her husband; and
b. the recommended prohibition in (a) on forcing upon a
woman the nationality of her husband should extend to
requiring states to ensure that any incentives for a
woman to acquire the nationality of her husband or
partner do not effectively deny her right to choose her
nationality.
5. In the case of a family of mixed nationality living in a state
of which one or more, but not all, of its members is a na-
tional,
a. the state in which the family is living should recognize
the right of the non-national family members to enjoy
equal treatment with nationals in relation to certain
civil rights and social, economic and cultural rights,
including the right of residence and right to work; or
b. the states involved should recognize
i. the right of each spouse or partner to acquire, af-
ter a short waiting period, the nationality of the
other spouse or partner without losing his or her
own nationality; and
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ii. the right of the children to acquire and keep the
nationality of both parents.
6. Where a state facilitates the acquisition of nationality by the
spouse or partner of a national, the state should ensure that
the method of facilitation does not subject the foreign
spouse or partner to the risk of abuse by the national spouse
or partner.
7. As provided for in article 9(2) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
and other international human rights treaties, states should
grant women equal rights with men with respect to the na-
tionality of their children. In a case where a child's parents
are of different nationalities, each parent should have the
right to transmit her or his nationality to the child, even if
this would result in the child's holding dual nationality.
8. States should provide effective remedies for individuals who
have lost or been denied that state's nationality due to dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, whether that discrimination
is on the basis of the individual's sex or as a result of the in-
dividual's relationship to a spouse, partner or parent.
9. States should develop and implement mechanisms for study-
ing the effect of the administration of their rules of
nationality on women and ensuring that nondiscrimination
in the rules of nationality is not compromised by the admini-
stration of these rules. This might involve, for example, the
provision of gender-sensitivity training for those involved in
the administration of the state's rules on nationality.
10. Women should have effective representation in all reforms to
nationality law, whether at the domestic or international
level .269
In conclusion, we emphasize that the argument from equality in this
article does not prefer the solution in recommendation 5(a) to that in
5(b), greater rights for the non-national members of families where the
spouses have different nationalities over dual nationality for such fami-
lies, or vice versa. For conceptual or pragmatic reasons, one solution
may well be superior, whether globally or in a given state. Indeed, equal-
ity may be a reason to find one superior to the other. But our analysis in
269. Feminism and International Law, International Law Association Resolution 5/2000,




the article does not go this far. Just as we have sought to show the variety
of contexts in which gender equality is at issue in nationality law, it can-
not be assumed that all women who seek equality in this regard hold the
same idea of nationality as it relates to their identity, their culture, their
part in society, their vision of the world, and so on. It is striking that
however alike the early women campaigners for equality in nationality
may seem to us now, they too differed in some or all of these ways.
Women's quest may reflect not a general cosmopolitan ethos, but a
deeply specific commitment to the transmission of their nation's culture
or their role in its politics. 270 It may also reflect the realities of the private
and public environments in which they make and actualize choices about
their lives. In this light, our aim has been to expand the understanding of
the equality issues that remain in the law of nationality three-quarters of
a century after Chrystal Macmillan spoke about the subject to the ILA
one October day in 1923.
270. See, e.g., BREDBENNER, supra note 8, at 11-13; Rupp, supra note 13, at 146-50.
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